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ControNrS,y over the FU't.h

Ita maifest abuse bT ap1fth
ftInld.rlg t1gureo

cauaea

8Wr.r

CRllm~.AL

~

ball mlObed a cnscendo in

Amar.tom to pauae 8Dt1

end pl"Otesaiorual

t1me.

ot the

r8C~,

ponder t..hese fa l'I'Ords from tbtJ

ot our Oonat.1t,ut,1on. NO PlmSOli •••SUAU:. BE

CASTi TO BE A WmlE'SS AGAnrsT

OUl"

Oonmnm1ata,.ft .. _11 .. b;r 80me

or our national labor unions,

tb1.llldag

Eill 01: R.1ghta

~t

OOYi:'~'llJJ'J}

nt A rr.
1

H";~£LF.

Att.ent.ton. then, is d1rected to tI'l6 lfitth AIaldamt these days because of

its use, or abuae, 1.'1 Congreseiona1irMtst1gationa. It 18 not the

~lurpoae

of

thiII paper to question the right of oongresldonal oor:mtteea to conduct 1nYestigatione. That right. 18 well eatab11abed. fbe queotton 10, rather,

it Bhall be

~ught

~, in

to 1lfIlUght by the

ccmJurwUon w.l.th

~

shelter

~ and ~&

is bet.ter that nille guUtq go

~

ot

~

the Fifth ~ ~

u:T ~ft foellng that it

than that GOO 1nnooent be harmed through

reoeal ot the p:ri.vi.lGge. others, such _ R1cl'w'd 3a. . lI.I'iting in the
Bar Joumtj, -act t..'lat. the privlloee aga1n8t aalt-4..nm."1m1nltJon 10
~

hom ot • d18tant,

aee

and

ot pmaeouUng praat.1cGs

~...

1m -

.4.

....

whiCh no longer pre-

van. .l third group, led by Judge &Anull IIotstadter of Nour York, VOVld suspend
the privilege 1n certa1n C'\)u and subatituto • guarlDtee of i~V f'l"om

proeecut.lon lor tm:f or1.m the 1dtneas

1

~

Nwa11n the couroe ()f the inter-

2
rogation., The

1m and most devoted group 1f\')uld not on.l.y' retain the privilege"

but insist that .. dr_ no inference of guilt from its invocation. !hese last
have as their eloquent spokesman the Dean of the Harvard La School, Ernest

1.

Grinold, 1\Ihose 11ttle book,

influence not only on the

!h! Fif~

.Anendmellt To4!l;, has had

ttenol'l'lDUS

publio but on :recent legal decisions• ..l 'this

rather super:f'1clal volume has been

d&vastat1n~

answered by Sidney Book.

However, neither author calls into question the need for such an,Amendment nor
its raison 2'e,tre, but

guilt that we uy or

genera~

lU,Y

confines his attention to the internees of

not draw from the plea of the Fifth Amendment.

The intellectual confusion surrounding this Amendment is turt.."ter complies .....

ted by unblushing

poll'~cru.

bias. About thirty' years ago llberal opinion in

our nation ....lcomed congressional investigation of crime, mnopol;y', and
whil.e deploring the occasional resort
leading wltness.s.

to the Fifth Amendment

Today, liberal thought takes

investigations" espec1al.l¥ of Comnm1.8m..
pJ.ead the Fifth Allendment, they' regard

a~
tbe~

II

by Bome

eratt,

ot the

dim view of congressional

so far from condemning those 'Who
-instead as champions of'. civil

liberties who have taken thetr stand on the basis of principle, or who have

nobl\r cHJIdained to inform on friends.
"'Iftlat think ye of the Fifth A:pmdmtmt?" has thus become one of the burrW2g

questions of the dq.

Now one will think mre or leSI of the Amendment depend-

ing on whether or not it i l • natural right of

me.

Arul~sis

of naturalla.

natural rights, man and the State should yield the anner., revealing the
privUege as a fundamental right or • merelY rescindable rule of procedure.

1

Sidney Hook, Commn ~n.e ~ ~ Fittq Amendnaat (New York,

1957), 13.

3
Another approach, and. the one which I have adopted, is to search the cases.
commentaries, and legal literature for arguments Which would indicate whether
or not the right is natural.
~le

final question we

wlll consider is also

war~

disputed--whether

invocation of the Amendment cre;ates an inference su:tf'icient to warrant discharge from key poSitions, and other civil penal.tiee.

In other words, was-

the Fifth Amendment intended not only to protect the individual i'rom producing

evidenoe of his own partiC\V', but also to leave his reputation in the same
pristine state after his invocation as before?
We wi1l1'lOl1 take up the analysis of these three issues, that by weighing

the evidence earetulJ.y, _

ID63' reach true and reasonable conclusions•

.' -

CHAPTER II

Whenever in the oourse of this thesis I shall refer to the Fi.f'th Amen'

....

I shall always intend that single clause which states that no person shell be
co~lled.

rus

to be • witnes. against hims.U.

gins in English ecclesiastical and CODlJ¥)n law.

wignDre,

'AS

formula had its historical on ..
The devel<;p .nt, according to

along two distinct and parallel lines, lithe one an outgrowth of th It

other, succeeding it, and yet beginning just before the other comes to an end.
The firat is the history of the opposition to the

'!! ...o...fti
.......o....i ...
o' oirth of the

.0....

clesiaatical co urts J the s.cond is the history of the opposition to the criminating question in the common-law courts, i.e., of the present privilege in

its modern shape.wl
Prior to the time ot Willim the conciua~r, bishops sat as judges in the
~

popular courts. William put an end to this by requiring bishops to decide just
those cases which cams under ecclesiastical law. Thus sprang up • separate
system and a double judicature, the ecclesiastical and the civil courts.

Up to

this time the compurgation system was still in full force in the popular and
2
royal courts.
Thus a detendant could clear himself by swearing to his Oft

1 John Henry 'W'igDDN_ Evidence.

-

"rei ed.,

2xb1d. 280.

4

(Boston"

1940>.

nIl, 277.

innocence and by bringing in • couple of oath-helpers to do llkewise.

It ie

interesting to note that the new ecclesiastical courts lmre the first to do

awII:I with this practice. The oaths of t)tho and Boniface in the years 1236 and
1272 respectively.. were a distinct innovation and pledged the accused to ananr

truJ.y• .3 This ns followed by an interro~ation
assential details of the affair.

or the

defendant concerning the

The old cOlDl;>urgation oath consisted mere13 in

daring and succeeding to pronounce a formula of innocence 'fIil.jrJl operated ot
itself as a decision. The new oath, h01fE)ver.. furnished material for the judge

to reach his own personal conviction and deCiaion.4
As

the years passed.. the oaths of Otho and Boniface nna so interpreted

that the defendant could not bP made the subject of a .fishing expedition, but

could only be tnterrogated if there are Bone sort of presentment, or wi tneas..~
or bad repute. 'This was expressed in the Latin i'ol"lll'fll.. RLicet.!!!.!2 tenettu.;
~s,:! £~dere, tamen

!2! iDnocenti-!

!!'

2rod1tus l!.! !amlllll tenetur sek!1ll1l oatande,!! ut.rum Eossit

ostende~ ~ se1pau-'ll 12g~r,e.·

. "VIh11e

no one is required to

betra;,r himself', nevertheless one reputed to 'be quiltq can be riquired to presen1

himself' and vindicate his innocence if he ean."

Thiedictum according to the

h1storim Hallam had ita origin in English COlDlll)n 1_.

Bnt l'-ks PlO llk'TDY' bulvf8l'l.

3Jusjurandum calwmiav in causis ecclesiastiois et civilibus de ''''erltate
dicenda in spiritualibus, quo ut veritas tacillus aper1atur et causae cel.nus
ternrl.nentur, statuimus praestari de eetero in regno Angliae secundum aanonicd
at legit1mas sanction.a, obtenta consuetudine in contrarl.wn non obstante. As
quoted bJ." Wigloore, 278. Author's translationt iYa ordain and establish that
pencef'orth in the IiDgdom of England.. in all oases oivil or ecclesiastic, lin
oath to tell the truth shall be exacted mder pain of' canonioal and legal penalty, in order that the truth may be mre e.aily oi$Cov.:-red and causee n:nre
fi,uickly terminated. any practice to the contr817 notwithstand1ng.

4wtemre, 281.

6
of human :f'r&edom, this bastion, too, began to decay. In the anxiety ot fifteen io
tb and sixteenth century England over the influx

ot heresy, judges came to

de-

mand less and lass in the WtI¥ of presentnwnt or bad repute, and to subject .!St
luspected perf!lon to interrogation under the oath to tell the truth.
'l'he first man to challenge sucoessfully this right to the ecclBsiastical

-

-

courts to examine a suspect "ex officio maroa wes John Lilburn in 1631. Lilbum was suspected of inporting and purveying heretical and aeeli t10us 11tara-

ture. 'Uhen put on his oath to answer the questions of the court, he refused..
and eventuaJ.:b' his retueal was sustained. lie must caretuJ.ly note, however,
that LUburn's protest wus againat interrogation in the absence of • formal
accusation, not agc1nst interrogation .. such. In his trial he clearly state.
that he is perfectly willing to anSrter all questions prpperly placed, but that
the present investigation Yrdunlat'ul ai.nce he was never tormal.ly' charged with
at\V Crime.5 Lilb1lftl had never clrd.ned the right to refuse abaolutel;r to answer

• criminating question" he had merel,y demanded a proper proceeding of present-

n:unt or accusation.. But now this once vit44 .distinction comes to be ignored.
Around 16$0 defendants. began to claim flat:b" that no man is bound to inoriminat
himself on IlI\Y oharge (no matter how properly" instituted). or in any court (not

mereq in ecclesiastical or Star Chamber tribunals). Judges began to concede
the claim and by the end of the seventeenth century the right was estabUshed

and extended to include an ordinary witness as _11
the privilege

'irQ ..

Stuburn1s

6wig:coore,

matter

or

judiCial decision only.

Jrial,- Howmf.l State Trials,

299,

~

v.

88 the party

!!! Jers!l,t

m.

charged. But

It was not included in

l.3lS (1631).

211 US 78 (1908).

1
either the Engl1ah BUl of Rights or the Petition of Right, and of course had
not even been thought of untU long after Jl'agna Carta. Or as Professor wigmore

puts itl ltihatever it ••s lIOrtb to the American Conat1tution-makers ot 1789, it

was not worth IlBntioni.."1g to

the English Corurt.1tution-D8nders

ot l.689.-7

In equi\y ooUl'tra the privil!t ge w. also becoming • f:1.xture.

lit 1731 Lord

HardwicD in denying discovery in an action for rents and profits said that

"there is no rule more estabUahed in equity than that a person shall not be
obl.1ged to discover ..mat 11111 subject him to • penalty or atVthing in the natlm

ot a penalty.-

8

It see_ fair to conclude that by' the middle 'of the eighteenth

century they were giving tull l'8oognition to the privilep in equity.

"!he

scarcity or non-axist8nce ot reported ca.es in which the privilege was applied
in civU actions at common 1_ may be explained by the

tact that from the

.ar~

l6OO1 8 to the middle ot the nineteenth centU1'Y parties were disqualified
witneuea and

80,

at least after the middle ot the 1600' I, were interesiie4

part1es • .9
..

Following the Revolution of 1688,

U

...

·have seen, Bngllsh cr1iir1nal

pr0.-

cedure underwent a marked alteration, and the queetioning of accused defendantG
soon ceased ent1rel¥. But while this ohange undoubtedly testU'ies to the

gl"01II-

ing inn_nee or the maxim against self-d.ncrimination. the manner in which it

.... etfected was by' extension from cinl to
party

crimina

cases of the rule that •

is not a coupetent witness on accOl.Ult of interest. "The result was that

-

7Ibid• .301.

aAs

quoted by E. fde )forgan, .Selt-Incrimi.nation.... .!:!!!!.
(December, 1949), 9.

-

9lbid.

~

!!,!., LUIV

8

henceforth the Jlbuth ot an accused. and his 'Wite'. as "WOll, was cl08ed whether

!.2!. or

against himlelfJ and it is in this form that the immunity of accused

persona passed to the _ncan colonies, balanced., that 18, by the correspnndiftj
disability. Not tmtll 1878, following a simUar reform in several ot the state

was the right to testify in their own behal!, under oath, accorded defendants
in the national. courts • .,10
S1nce interrogation of the accused waS not undertaken in the colonies atte
1700, it was not one of the abuses which led to the American Revolution.

As it

was the correction of those abuses which was the prim.ar:r purpose of the revo1utioniata, they were not gravely' conoemed with the privUege.

It is not, for

instance, mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, which l.uts twnty-aine

grievances against the Brttish Crown. Neither the Declvation ot Rirf.hts by the
Stamp Act Congress of 176S nor that of the Continental Congress ot ln6 inolud&
the privUege in their enumerations

ot fun.<.i.anlantal rights. The section ot the

Northwest ordinance corresponding to the

ptfth

Amendment omits the privUege.

The tramer. of eight of the original s\ate constitutions and the crea.tors

ot the Federal Constitution found no place for the privUege in their respectiv
instruants. . While Thomas Jefferson and Richard Henry Lee protested vigorousl1
against the omission from the Constitution of freedom of religion, freedom of
the press.. the habeas corpus guarantee. trial. by' jur,y, etc., they were silent
as the grave about the exclusion of the self-incrimination priv:Llege.ll

l~rd S. Corwin, "'the Suprelll! Court Construction ot the Sell'-Incrimln...
tion Clauae,. 1ttchigan ~ Revielr,& XXXII (November. 1930), 10.

llthe

1950),

Peo;ele Shall ~, staft of Soc. So. Dept., Uld.v. ot Chi. (Ohic£tj,o,

!;""3~O.

9
With this background it ma;y seem

fA

little singular that the :}rivl.lege was

incorporated into the American Bill of Rights at

Q].l.

One view attributed the

inclusion to -French influence and ;)ointa out that the subject was actively agitated there durine the revoluticnru.7period.

Representatives to tile National

Assenbl.1 (Estates General) from every DeparteIlmlt in France were instructed to
insist tq)on a provision against

sel£-Llcriml~ation.

other scholars feel that

the stream of influence was toward France !rom America at that time.

Perhaps

we can conclude with Mr. Williams of the New York Bar that "an internediate
viErw seems .flual.l$ tenable-the exch.ange of libertarian ideas between the
Un! ted States and France in the decade of the 1130' s.,,12

Whatever the £low of innuence" the privilege against self-incrimination
found its way into our Federal. Bill of Rights drawn up in 1791. The fiI'st case
under the Fifth Amendment did not arise until 1885. almost one hundred years
later.

V~by

the delay? Before answering this question we must answer that

ftmdamental question

~

the framers incorporated the Amendment at all since

defendants had not +.estified at crirJinal
(since

lOON

t~ls

.,
for almost one hundred years

1700).

The ans'"er is sl11llle.

In the a:il.rly state oonstitutions, as in the FU'th

-

Amendment, immunity .froll sel.f-inorimination is lis ted merel3' as one of a whole

,areal of privileges which \lere in

t.~e

n.ain of interest to accused persons and

to no others. That isto say. the problem being dealt with was the L."1?r::nElr:r!nt
of the lot of accused persons, a concentration of interest W'n.ich was due to the
tradition of the harshness of the comrron In in this respect. and to the terribl

"Problems of the Fifth A.'U8ndment," Fordham Law
1
.-

10
At the same time,

severity of the English penal code in the eighteenth century.

since the constl tutional provisLnsacntioned above did not overrule the commn law in eJroluding an accused from the witness stand, their stipulation for
hts :tmrrmnlty tal'.sn by it1:lelf becarne')ointless.

If only, therefore, to save the

framers of these provisions from t.'le charge of having loaded them with a meaningless tautology, their languap had to be given other than its lit.ra1. sig-

nificanoe, and the conm::>n

1&1'1

was at hand to supply' t~is in rich neasure.13

Now the commn law laad Qlrea<tr established by

1789 that the pr-lvilebEt pro-

tected witnesses as well as de£enda11'tsj that it protected the incrL::ti.',ating
£Qpe,r~

of the defendantJ that it protected the defendant and witnesses in civil

proceedings from revealing matter which mr"ld subject them to criminal prosecution. For alIll)st one hmldred years then, until 188,5, the criminal co'.ns
interpreted the Fifth Alnendment in the light of

CO:mrno:1

law.

No appeal was ever

made because the decisions of the comnlOn law were too well established. However
in ~ v. United states. specific provisfan of an act of Congress was in-

volved.. with the result that recourse against it to the

COII/.l'OOn

1_ Unsupported

by the Constitution would have been futili, for llIlSupported comr.r:m law must

yield to statutory

1_.14

In the Boyd case the Suprene Court held 'tt'lnt seizure or compulsory production of a i1llll' 8 private papers for use as evidence against him is eq,uivalent

to compelling him to be • witness against himself and therefore within the pro-

13&tb Boyd v. United state:; and Counselman v. Hitchcock, infra, are
replete witli"TiiV'ocatl'ons of the OOl'::nfDn 1 - . '
·

,.

14ab"{d v. United States" n6 US 616 (1835). For specific treatumt of
em,
ff-13.

t:n.is 'Oro

or. conrtri..

11
hibition of the Fifth Aliendmnt.

Slx years later, in

CounselIl~

v. !,!itchcoc!st

tr'1e smne court held that the privileee extends to • ;witness called

-1;.0

testify

before • grand jur.y investigating violations of the Interstate Conmtrce L_,
and was not limited t.o caseS of criminal prosecution against the witness himselt.

In that Case the Court established the rule that the object of the Fifth

Amendment was to "ensure that a person should not be compelled, when acting u
a witness in any investigation to give testimorx,y which might tend to show that

he himself had committed a crime.

but is as broad as the mischief

The pri.vi1ege is limited to oriminal matters

af~ainst

In ,!COa!"!S: v. Arndstein the

which it seeks to guard. tllS

~rlvilege waS

further enlarged to eniJrace

civil prooeedings. Citing the Coul1seL>nan case, the Suprens Court in 1926 held
that "'the priviJ.ege is not ordinaril;;r dependent upon tlle nature of the pro-

ceedings, but rather

'f!JIiq

be invoked whenever the answer might tend to subject

to criminal responsibility him who gives

it. The privUege proteots

II

mere

'witness e fully as it does one who is alf!o. a party defendant.,,16
There remained one fina1 question--'Whether the privilege could'. be stretch

to embrace hearings in congressional investig&tiona. An af£irmative <iW.swer was
given in

195, in

,2.U1tas J and
~edin~

t..lte three cases of Quin..Yl v. !Jnited St.ta~, Emspak v. United

~ v. United ~.tes.17 Thus we see that a witness

whatsoever in whioh testinJ)ny is legally required

~

E.! !.Sl. pro-

refuse to answer

fm:.{ question when his answer might be used against him in a f'uin:.re legal

-

15142 us 547 (1890).

16266 VI 34 (1926).
17349 US 155. 190.. 219 (1954).

12
crininal proceeding, or which might uncover' further evidence against him..
To claim the privilege it is not necessary that your answer of itself
wotud support a oonviction, for it is sufficient that "answers to the questions

_

......_---

asked. • • 'W:Juld have furnished a ............
link _.........
in the chain of evidence needed in a

18 The court here reasons,
prosecution of' petitioned• • • "

and I think rightly

so, that a man convicts himself' as effectively by revealing the missing piece,
as by disclosing the entire puzzle of his

cnne.

The witness or defendant must explicitly claim (though in no fixed forll1ula
his constitutional immunity or he will be considered to have waived i tJ but he
.i8 not the final judge of the soundness of his cllim.
mining the

The prooess for deter-

valid! ty ot the witne8s t claim was neatly SUllll!8d up by Chief Justioe

John Marshall,

When a question 18 propounded it belongs to the court to consider whether
an;r direct answer to it can ir:1plicate the witness. It this be decided in
the negative, then he may answer it without violating the privilege which
is secured to him by In. It III direct answer to it ~ i."'1criminate him,
then he must be the s ole judge what his answer would be. The court cannot
participate with him in this judpement. because they cannot deCide on the
effect of his anner Tdthout knowing .....t it would be, and a disclosure of
that fact to the judge would strip him of the privilege which the l a
aUO'II'I, and which he claims. It folloll'S necessari.ly then, that i f the
question be of such a description that an GnS'W'er to it E.!!l ~ ~ ~
criminate the witness.. accord:i.ng to the purport of that Mewer;-It must
rest Wl'tll EImse'I1, w110 alone can tell what it Vlould be, to mlS'Wer the
question or not. If, in such til cue, he say upon his oath that his answer
lVOuld criminate himseU, the court can demand no otller testimny of the
fact. If the declaration be untrue, it is in conscience and in law as mud
a perjur,y as if he had declared any other ~mtruth upon his oath, as it is
one of these cases in which the rule of law must be abandoned, or the oath
of the witness be received.19
The courts have further held that the privUege exists solely for the pro-

18340 US 159 (1950).

19~ite~ States v. Burr, In re \'lUlie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (1307).
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tection of the witness himself', and may not be claimed for the benefit of third
20
•
parties.
For the pnvilege is a strict13 personal one and witness has no
right to refuse to incriminate others.

Indeed.. if the witness knows that hiS

associates have committed a seriolw erina, the refusal to disclose that fact
makes the witness himself guilty of the crime

ot misprision of felony. The com

mon sentiments of the American pEtCple place a high regard upon personal loyalty
the role of inforrllBr is a repugnant one.
imn8diate and consequently

lIDre

Loyalty to onets fellows is more

c;)~lllng

loyalty due to society as a whole.

than the rem>te and r,enerilized

But regardless of these considerations of

private norallty and personal predilections, the government demands from its
citizens their full cooperation in supnlying information relevant to ihe t>roper

concerns of p,overament.

It may even be necessary to testify against rrother and

father and immediate family which ts ?Srhaps harder than testifying aeainst
oneself', but the ,)r1v1lege does not protect them.
As we shall see later on, one of the \?bjections against imunity statutes
.,
is that they taU to ehield the witness from: rlisgraceahd the consequent los.

of reputation and standing in the community.
Courts have alwqs denied a witness

tJ18

But.as a matter of fact Anerican

privileee of refusing to testify to a

material issue when his only claim has been that his answer would result in
disgrace.

The prirlCipal case on

t.~e

question of disgrace, Brown v. lfalker.

fortifies Wigmore's contentil)n that there is a vast difference hetween prlvilog~
2l
against dist,"l'aee and prlvUege against self-incrimination.
In the instant

20a0gers v. l!nited Sta~BI 340 US 367 (1951).

2~1

tS S91 (1898).

case, the witness
disgrace remained.

fiS

notsubjecu to proseoution" and only the possibility of

Her testimny was material to the issue.

firmed the principle .that

Ii

person can keep silent only when,

criminal fiCtion against the witness can result.

The court reaf-

b't.r speaking.

"When the effect of the ques-

tion would be on~ to tmVeU the witness' put indisoretions, the

COt'lrt

will

not !",!rmit the witness. pride or rerutation to block the adm1nistration of
justioe. tl22
Possibly the best diSCUSSion against disgraoe is by Mr. Justice Field 1n
his dissent to Brown v. Walker, where he states that the intent of the framrs
of the Oonstitution was not alone to ~rotect a witness against self-incrimination, but at the same time to save him "in all cases from the shame and inf'UV
of confessing disgraceful crimes, and thus preserve to him such rneasure of

self_respect. ft23
The broadest privilege, that of refusing to answer a question on the
grounds of disgrace eYen though the questi?n is relative to t.he )rincipQl isswu
of the case, was allowed in one federal. trltd, that of United state,! v. James,
cited by Ju..c;tice Field in his disst3ntinq oPinion.
i f any acceptance elsewhere.

24 This

view has bund lIttle

The major!ty and best view supports t..~e rr:tvilege

8f;ainst d:i.sf"Taoe only llhere material issues or tile veraoity of the w1.1~ncsses

are not in question. 25

-

22Thid.

23Ibid•

-

24uni.ted States v. J ..'lIeSs 60 Fed. 2$7 (1394).
25John iharton, Oriminal,. Evidence, llth ed., (New lork, 1935), 11ll9.

Th~

benefit of the Fifth Atpendment was consider~bly restricted when the

courts held t.hat the clause does not protect the cl.&imant if T)l'"osecution is
26
hi.rred by lapse of tir.'l8, b".r statutory enactraent, or by a pl rdon.
Nor can the
federal. privilege be claimed by
prosecution under

lit

state la.

~

witness in order to avoid incrir.rl.nation and

27

This holding is baaed on the English rule

that does not protect a witness ar;a.inst disclosing offenses iT. violation of the
laws of another country. 28 Our Suprem Co·urt thus concluded that iml!luni ty
a~ainst

state prosecution is not essential to the valldity (;f feder.a statutes

declaring that a vdtns£s shall not be excused from giving testimony on the

ground that it will in.criminate him.
Conversely, in state courts :i.t is held that

lit

witness must

~vestif:r

under

an i!ilQuni ty statute even though he will thereby be exposed to feder.u prosecution. 29 Thic interpretation was not introduced without

lit

vigorous dissent from

Justice Black who observed that "never since the Bill of Rl.ghts

lias

until today, has this court, sustained .. si.ngle conviction

feder ..l of£enae

\vhich rested on selt-incrinrl.natory

testimo~

fOl' i\

adopted,

'forced from the accused.

I cmmot

agree to do so now.-30
The holding of the QreElnleaf case was qualified to some

e:~tcnt

in Applica-

26arown v. Walker, 161 US $91.

27Un1ted States v. MurdOCi: 284. US l41 (19.31); Meriwether v. State,
S S..E.2a
(l~40" t1nite3 SiR S V. !!!. Pierre, 128 '.2&. 919 (19~).

, .'

n

28

Re,~ v.~EJ" 121 Engl. Re~~nt
t'J..llc~x,
lJ~ate!rI'i'!S n.s. 10,0 (1.);,0).

730, ~.2! ~ ~ Sicilies v.

291!.! !! GreerJ.eaf.', 28 N'IS2d 20 (1941).

30reldman v.

UniteS

States. 322 US 487 (1944).
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~

.2£ I!erlnnds..

where a witness refused to answer C31'"tQin quest.bns on the

gro1mds of possible incrimination under the laws ot New Jersey or of tho Feder
Government, even though a statute .granted him complete .freedom from. prosecution
in lJei\'" Y::;rk State in regard to any of the matters a'boat which he ,dght testify.. 3.

The court stated that his contention that he was not ?rctected under the atatute from possible prosecution in another jurisdictl.::m

~ns

absolutely true, but

Vlant on to s-.r th...t a st4l.te is only required to prot.ect the witness from prose
cutien in its own courts.. However, if'

Ii

witness could

2I'OVC

thc;.t the danger of'

prosecution in another jurisdiction was re&l. and substiilntial £md the

CO'ltrt

was

satisfied of tl:at fact from the evidence, then ftit il: the duty of the cot<.rl.
under such circumstances, to protect the witness from any disclosu:ro vihich
might expose him to prosecution in the foreign jurisdiction. n32
It should be noted that the federal rule is followed in the majority of
jurisdictLins, lmeroin the courts

trure

the view that possibilittJ of incrimina-

tion under the 1av18 of another state, ox upder federal 1avvs, is

~

a basis for

the assertion of the privilege.)3 However in all probability, cO~Bidering the
nature .of the present Supreme Court. 11..'1.18

1)08i tion

Ydll

Borm be

1iberllllized.

We can eXl:lect a judicial declarati;)n that congressional immunity statutes are
binding in
of

oo""h

Coni~'

foderal and stote jurisdiction upon the thoor-.f

such statutes become tho st..'P1"Sme lay; of the land,

as\'1ell as federal prosecuticn.

.3l,.2h NYS2d 402 (1953).
32lbid•

330f• 58 Am Jur 53.

that~ DS

L'.n act

lire venting

state

17
If an accused takes the stand of his own initiative, then be

to cross-examination. 3h

If he fails to testit,y, unfavorable

inferences are not to be drawn other than s'.lch

3S

~ilu.st

s-..hmit

prest~~tions

and

ma.y be dravm f'r()lll his fail'Ul'e

to expl.Rir. . incriminating fects that lie within his own peculiar knowledGe, and
neither the judt,,;e nor the pr:>s9Cuting attorney
the accused to take t..~e E;tand and testLI'y.35

:rr'.rty co~nt

u;"on t.h,e failure of

Indeed the judr;e sho"lld charge

the jury that the f aUure of the accused to testify does not create artr pres'.unption aga.inst him and is not to be \;.Sed by t."lo jury to his prejudice. 36
The Firt.~ A.:nendricnt is of co ..:rse

Q

lL'1Ii.tation on the federal ;;ower only"

and has no ap,-,lication to ~roceedines under the author:tty of the state.37
This beeause the privUeGe against selt-incrL'Ilination is not one of the fundanental rights of national citizenshi:), so as to be included aroong the ~jrivilegeJ

and imunities of citizens of the iJnited States which the states are forbidden

to

~b!'tdge

by the Fo'::rteenth t:l.mendr:.:mt.38

firmly estt.lblished than tha.t which

Iii

i'i'ords to a ?.:itness the ::ri-rllece of re-

..
35c:l:'. 5.3

Am Jur 81.

3"5.

3623 U.S.C.A. 632.
37~d(;r v. ~., 291 us 97. 90

A!J1.

575 (1933).

381\;ir.d.;r: v. lJE;"W t.T6lrscll _2ll US 73 (1900). COP.1CH:lre State v. Height, 117
Iowa 6~, 91 • 93~S9'm 4371 holdine that the exemption is reqUIred tJy
due:)xoeess cf law. See also 50 1...111 Jur 44..
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~r

th.e defendant or witness in
answer

+.0

cri;n:i.:r..u. proceadi!;.:

Co!'

a question ,,-ouJ.d yield evidence vi .. cri(;l6.

cid.1 tl'icl. ,\'llCrc the
The ';irivUcE;O i8 s-triotl;j

personal, for the protection of indiv"'iduals and not corporations, nor for the
1xm&f:Lt of third pOArties.

In considerinG a vd.tm::ss' clau of privilc CO against

sel.f-incrim:i.J."lstion, the feder ..l cota'ts will not take ll:Jtice c)l

ciGi'end&'!!1t's i';,;,ULlre to testify ill his

st.ance ind.ic;;;ting tis ell.Ut, :l(,r
~,ri"lrik

of the

Fo~:.rte6nth

self, and

o~m

C~:Ul t..~o

h'er.nli' C811!'..Ot

~,o

have adClpted

gl'~:r.t

of

i:"Ji,1:mi tyJ

1,)8

etc.

A:lilEtndr.lent does not include

-:::16

Y.t.v.:;I'(l

~ CireUi'll-

;'ll"('secl'.tl,;:;r,is ":Iarred by

Finally.. t..1.e due
ri.;ht

.r~ot

the amendment is not binding upon the statO$.
Si!rd.~2r

t·:.ken as

pI'osecuting att,orney cc:m::iOnt il.?0n it.

ge falls find the: '"in tnel'lS ';:ust tr;;sti:'y

lapse of tiro, tiardon,

c:1.'iminal lnf

It is -the "rule in l'l.a!:vr jur:J.sdictions that the

of :mother st.t.e or sovereignty.

7he

t!1G

i)l'OvisiollS in their Gvm const1tl.1.tiona..

;;l"'OCEWG c~ause

to incrird.r:ate oneHOlisver Ihost states

CHAPTER liZ

It wuld be well to preface this chapter with a brief consideration of
natural law and natural rig)lt according to the philosophia

~erreni.s.

The idea of natural. law is a heritage of Christian and classical thought.
It goes back beyond the philosophy of the ei dtteenth century to Suarez, Thomas
Aquinas,. Augustine, Cicero and the Stoics, and

to the great nnrilists of

antiquiV. Aristotle, Plato, and Sophocles. "Antigone is the etemal lleroine
of natural law. which the ancients

called·~

umIIId.tten law, and this is the

nane most befitting it.ttl
Man is possessed of • human nature.

Ue is also gifted with intelligence

by which he acts with an understanding of what he is doing.

Thus he has the

power to determine for himself the ends which he wID pursue. Howe'il.J3r since
man has a nature, and t..ltus is fashioned in • certain determined way, he has
certain determined ends Which correspond with this nature.

This means that there is by very virtue ')f human nature ltan order or a

disposition Which human reason can discover and according to wnich the human
will must
being.

~t

in

The 1llIW1'itten law. or natural law, is nothing IlDre than that. tt2

ItaturU

]a w,

.-...w;,..-_ _ _ __

f\

-

order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human

'Ibid.

64

then. is the partiCipation of a rational creature in the

20
eternal law of God, and by means of ,vilich he is directed toward his final end.

er

in the 'beautitul figure of St., Augustine, the eternal law is the seal, and

t.'1e natural law is its impression in the rational nature of !!lan, which in turn
is an image of God.

Thus at birth the natural law is in man only virtuall;tr ..

By examining the nature of things with the light of his reason, man formulates

the natural 1_ in a code of moral principles.

The general principles of this

code cannot be invincibl3' unknown by normal mature ;:)ersons, though its remote
ooncluai:DS can be so un1alown.

The first moral principle--do good and avoid

ttThere are othelt comrron or general prinCiples based on t.he first iOOral
principle, following from it with immediate inference, or with n8diate inference

80

Simple and eas,y that no normal mature person can fail to 11&ke it. a3

To people of nor_l intelligence theM co:n::on principles, suoh as the tan command~nents,

cannot be

inv1ncib~

unknown.

Then there are the remote conclusions, sometines called tertiar,y precepts"
derived by a complicaW<i reasoning procesS- and enuntlated in positiw law.

-.

l'he88 can remain

here for error
e>:.pansiOll

IS

invincib~

unknown even

to intelligent people. There is room

there is in arq science, just as there is also room for the

and developmnt which comes with centuries of study and application.

"The idea of natural law, at first imn'areed in r1 tea and rrtrthologyt differentiated itself only slowly, as slowly even as the idea of nature. a4
Now the idea of natural law implies the existence of such things as rights

3Austin Fagothey. S.J•• R1et ~ Reason (St. Louis, 1953), 1$9.

hv..r1tain,

6h.

2l

and duties, f.or a large pet of the natural lanr deals with the relations of
justice between men. .And a natural rip,ht is (;ne which man sho'.,ld enj!)y if he
is to fulfill

~le

the natural. law.

obligation of Qchieving his tinal end, imposed upon himb,r
The sane natural 1_ which l..,-s down our ;il)st tundamnt.al

duties is the very ln which assigns to us our fundamental rights.

The question then is to determine whether the Fifth Amendmnt is such •
vital component of the juridical order that, without, man would find serious
difficulty in ach1ev1ng his end.

In the f)revious chBt"'Jter we

co~leted

a survey of the judicial developllBnt

of • single clause of one a.mendment to the Con8tituti;:n, whioh states that, :ltJo
person. • •shall be compelled in

self."

an:r

criminal case to be • witness against bin;..

There are several observations that we can draw from this survey which

will be of assistance 1n solving the lineation whether the Fifth Amendment :is a

natural right of man.

regard to the privilege.

faile~

to tollow a consistent policy with
•
The efforts at first wre in the direotion of • lib-

Certainly the Supreme Court has

eral construction, as evidenced by the extension of the privUege from the defendant alone to witnesses, and from crimina);. cues alone to &

proceeding

whatsoever where the answer might subject the claimant to crinttnal prosecuiiion.
An attempt to restrict rather than expand the :.lrivilege was later seen in
'!:"lllings

which permitted compulsory exhibition of the defendant's body, the

wearing of certain clothing for the purpose of identification, medical examin....
tiona and foot and finger printing." In holding that the possibility of prose-

-

Sao1t v. United States, nB US 245 (1910).

22
cution in another jurisdiction does not, give rise to the ;:crivilece, the courts

have added

Q

further limitation.

The effort today is once again in the direction of liberal construction.
Chief Justice Warren recently indioated in the Wat1d.ns case the extremes to
Which the Supreme Court is prepared to go. 6 The witness Watkins cooperated fully with the congressional

his

Olm

invast1g~t1ng

comnlittee on all questions related to

association with the Conll11ul1ist Party. HOYiSver when questioned about

the possible communist a££iliations of his friends" Watkins simply refused to
answer. He was convicted cmd sentenced for contempt.

Court, the Fifth .Anendmant privileGE! was not raised

On appeal to tha Supreme

u.r either party as an issue

in the easEl, for Watkins had not claimed the privilege when questbned by the

cor:tmittee.

Iht just as if 1t Vlere an issue, Chief' Ju.stice Warren let 1,t be

known in his 1'f1.ajority opinion that

that priviJe ge could not have

ttany

prevaj~ed

challenge to Watkins' right to i.nvuke
betore the Supren:e Court...

7

Here for

t."1e first time the Court indicates t.hat the. witness oan claim the orivUege in
v

'

order to Shield another, whereas the settled'law lias always been that 'the privilege is personal and no one can inV'Oke the constitutional rights of another.

Saint Thomas

w\~uld

also take issue with the diotum of the Watldna case for he

declared that. "It is oontrary to tidelity to make known secrets to the injU17
of a p:1rson; but not if they be revealed for the eood of the comnnmity, which
should alW1YS be preferred to • private good."

61 L.ed.2d 1273 (1957).

-

7IbicI.

8
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An:! effort to discover the rationale of the yrivUege is further hindered
by such decisions as those which restrict the Fifth Amendment to defendants or

witnesses in a federal Jurisdiction, and not to any citizen in

arw

ju.r.tsdiction

or those decisions which exact testimol\Y' (in exchange for immunity) in a feder

court and permit the same testiDDl\Y' to be used later to convict the claimant
in a state court, or those whioh honor t..ll.e privilei.:e where there is d;;meer of

prosecution but insist upon disclosure of the crime where threat of prosecution
is non-existent because of pardon, immunity, etc.
So as we traoe the development of the doctrine on the Fifth A..'nen<:hient we
find that no rationale clearlY asserts itself' throughout as the ...
raisonI. _____
dtetre
of this ourious privilege.

Does it exist to protect a citizen from the roe-

volt1ng situation of (ll)ndemning himself? No, because that 1s precisely what he
does vAlen his immunized

testimo~

in the federal

COl~

is introduced into the

state courts, and as one dissent.inc: judge observed, it is small comfort to the
witness that his abode for perhaps the next twenty years .....i l l be a state, and

not a federal, pen.itentiaty. Perhaps it e:id;~s.ts to protect the witness' right
to silence, to privacy, or to • good reputation?

If so, these riehts have been

shamefully abused by immu...rdty statu.tes and the like.

One conclusion we oan reach fro!:! this survey of the leading decisions on
the Fifth Amendnant is that the courts have not considered the }X"lvilere u one
of the fundansntal, and therefore

natur:a~

rie.hts of rnan. To co!£irm this

judgement let us stud¥ the oases themselves and their commentaries.
'1'0 be sure, there have been juriSts who wrote of the privilege in terms of
a natural right. In the trial of' John Lilbu.rn the court said that "this oath
is against the ver,y lsw of nature for nature is

al~s

a ?reserver of itself.

not a destroyer. But i f • man takes this wicked oath he destro s and undoes

24
~e1f. as dailY experience doth witness. u9 This is certainly strong language
in favor of a natural. right interpretation, but tor good or ill, it was never
adopted by our own courts.
file closest that an .Anvitrican jurist has come to such a clear enunciation

of t..l-te privilege as a natural right is the

dissentin~

opinion of Mr. Justice

Field lIben he saida tithe essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to
ela;>ose his ovm guilt iEl obvious to everyone, and needs no illustration.
plain to every perSOn l1ho gives the subject a moment's thought.

It is

A sense of

personal degradation in being compelled to incri1ld.nate one's self must create a

feeling of abhorrence in the conmunity at its attell\'lted en:t'OrMmant. tllO Mr.
Justice Field finds that there are

two grounds tor the

incrim:1.nation, one of policy and one 01' humanity.

rule against self'-

That of policy forbids

placing the witness in a position where he would be under a strong temptation
to commit perjU1"Y'J that of humanity forestalls any effort to obtain a confessior
by- duress, "every 8pecies and description

~f which the 1_ Ibhors. ltll

•
However Mr. Juetice Field was unable to-persuade the majority of his court
or to influence the oourse of subsequent decisions.

The one cnse above all

others which indioates beyond dispute that our Supra. Court does not consider
the nrivilege as a basic right of the A7ooriom citizen is that of 'l'wini.tlg v.

!!2!

12

Jers!b decided in 1908 and never overruled.

Since it is such an impor-

•

9Howell, State 1'r1als, III, 1315 (1637}J see also!!::! v. United ~atefJ,
l68 "00 532.
lOBrown v. Walker, 161 US 591 (1898).

-

llIbid.

12¥ni~

v.

!!!. Jers!b

211 US 78 (1908).
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tant and far-reaching decision, we can

arrON

to consider it oarefully.

The deiendant Twining,. a director of a trust

grand

ju:r-~

co~"

was indicted by' the

for having knowingly exhibited a 1a1se paper to the bank examiner

with intent to deceive him as to the condition of the compauy.

tho

.1ury was instructed

At the trial

by the oo'~,rt that the'J might draw an unf"vorab1e in-

ference against one of the defendants for his failure to testify in denial ot
the evidence which tended to incrirrdnAte him.

The 1_ of the state of New

Jere6Y nerm1tted such an inference to be drawn. The defendant was convioted
and appealed to the SUp1'enB Court where it was argued th,t the New Jersey
statute permitting an adverse inference from the defendant's silence destroyed
the privUege

Court

WtaS

Q

gainat selt-incrinli.nation. Therefore the question before the

whether suoh a statute did or did not violate the Fourteenth Apmd-

Joont of the Constitution. eitiler by abridging the 13riv1.leges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, or by' depriv.lng persona 01 their lives, 1:Lbert;,r.
or property without due process of' Ift.13 :,
The court'. decision in this case was rendered by Mr'. Justice 2k>ody who

argued that it is mani.test from a review "of the origin, grovrth,. extent and
limits of the exemption trom compulsory selt-incrimination in the English la,
that it is not regarded as a part. of the law ot the land, or Magna Carta, or
the due process ot 1., which h,. been deemed an equivalent expression, but.
on the contrary6 is regarded .. separate from and independent of due process.

13A.mandrrsnt XIV• • • • llo State shall make or enforce any- 1.- which shall
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United StatesJ nor shall
~Y &tate deprive 8lV person ot lUG" liberty, or property, without due process
~r lM.
~bridge
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It came into existence not IS an

es:~ential

part of due i)rocess, but as a wise

and beneficent rule of evidence ciewloped in the oourse of judicial decision."

After establishing the tact that the privilege originated as at rule of
erldence, Hr. Justice Moody goes on to explore the question 'Whether the priv:.llege is of such a nature t.l-tat it m.ust be :!.ncluded in the ver-j concept of justice. He asks if the privilege is a .t'undamental principle of liborty :t."ld just e
which inheres in the very idea of a free govarm1£mt? His ansvJer is that none
of the great instruments 'Which we are accustomed to consult for the enu.nciat1o

of the f'1mdamantal rights o£ man made reference to it.

The privile ee was not

dreQIOOd of' tor hundreds ot years after :Magna Carta and "has no place in the
jurisprudenoe of

clvUi~ed

and free countries outside t.b.e domain of the common

1., and it. is nowhere observed Ql1xmg our own people in the search for truth
outside the administration of the 12W. nl$
From this Mr. Justice lbody conCludes that the t'riv:llege does not rill

within the historical neaning of due

proce~s

of 1., and asserts that it would
•
be going itr to rate it as an immutable princ11ple of justice which is the 1.nalienable 'r'}osseasion or every citizen ot a free government.

QSaluta~.r

as the

prillciple rntI.1 seem to the great majori't'.r" it cannot be ranked with the right

to hearing before cO:1demnat1on, the inmunity from arbitrary ponr not acting
by general laws .. and the inviolability of priVilte property• • • • It should.

:nnwt, and will be rigidly' observed where it is secured by speicific constitutional safeguards, but there is nothing in it which [dves it

~ v.!!!
15Ibid

_.

Jers!b 211 Tll 78.

Ii

swct1ty above
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and before constitutions themaslves. ftl6
As a final blow the Court adds. "There seems no reason whatever for strain"
ing the :neanine of due process of In' to incl1lde t.his privilege because,

perhaps, "

7.fIIly

think it of great value.

The privilege being only a useful

rule of' law and not a • :f'und.aJrJ!lntal principle of liberty or justice' it can be

abolished by a state at will and without infringement of the Federal Constltution.,..J.7
'V1hat the Court has hflre held 1s that the privilege agai.nst selt-incrim:i.na-

tion is not among the fundamental riehts, privileges or immunities which the

Fourteenth Amnclroont guarantees to every cithen of the United states.

Thus

the Court holds that this clause of the Fifth Amendment is a restriction ot
Feder!!; sOveDeignty only, and is in no

vm:r bindine

upon the states.

This reaeoro..1ng was confirmed in the Oft..q1lOted obite.r dicta of Mr. Justice

Cardo!,:o in Palko v. ...Conneoticut. There he observed that. r,rhe right to trial
by ,jury and the
1!Jlq

::i.ImmmiV .from proseci1.tion ,except as the result of an indiotment

have vaJ.ue and imporl;cnce. Even so, they are not of the very essence of •

6che~

o.t ordered libel"ty.

To abolish them is not. to violate a 'principle of

justine so root.ed in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. I

Few "WOuld be so narrmv er provinoial as to maintain

fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them.

that

ill

unat

is trus of jury trial and indictment::; is true also, as the cases shoW" of

the inEunity from self-incrimination.

1.6Ib1....
d.
l1Ib1d.

This too

mieht be lost,

and

justice stU to

28

J-;:;,~·I;.ioe

Cardozo is one of the ::;nst respected justices to sit upon the

Suprertl6 Court.

Yet it is his

be~ier

that the Fifth Amndment is not a natural

rieht 'but a :)rirllege, and l'urt.\;er"lDrc, a privilege that could be abrogated.
And if it were abolished. "no dcnlbt there

170uld

tection ar,ainst torture, physieue!' :-aental.

remain the need to give pro-

Justice, however, wotLld not

perish if the accused 1'fere subject to a duty to respond to
Such ;)l"O:ni.nent. ju......uts as Hughes,

as did

P~borts

nr~deis,

order~v

inq'IJiI"Y".-

and Stone concurred in t.'Irl.s opin1o

and Black.

I believe another proof that the co nrts hQ,tve not considered the ;')r:i.vilege
It

natural right is the f' a.ct that it

:1a8

been consistently held that defendants

in a court-.'ilI2rtial. he,ye no right to the privile!:6t despite t..he fact that they

are citizens in the serrlde of their count17.l9 Were it • natural rigb.t it
In~r~

could

SO~I1C

upon a

be denied them..

writers would like to base the privilege against self-incrinti.;:ultion
"

1.1ml t S

n&tllrU right to silence, or to' privacy-, or to h:is cood repu:'Gat

HO'1Ievcr this form of reasoning has not held up in the courtl'lnJlll, and these
rights have not been honored at the bar.

For example ill lJni~ !~ates v.

ThOI:.'l.88" the court declared that the rule that a witness oannot be cO:t:r,Jalled to
give self-incriminating testi:n»n.v has no 4p,llcation where prosecution wuld
be barred by 11 stat"l..-rte of l:5.m:itaticns, pardon, or grant of immlmity.2O

18302 lTS 319 (1937).
19U.S.C.A. Amend. V, Self-Incrimination, n 8a.,. 1956 Pocket PUI't, 1..1.2.
2Oti.l.9 Fed. SupP. $47 {194.3h of. U.5.0.A,. Amend. V•• Selt-Incrimination.
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'the rights to silence. privacy and good reputation tared

ba~

there as

they did also in United States v. Orman where the court held that a witness bel

. . . . ., .....

fore a congressional committee must re1.1'J tor protection against an undue invasion ;:,f his privac:r.. upon the requirement that ti:le question be

~~rtinent

to

the matter l.mder inquiry by the eonuttee, and it the qllestion is g:>ertinent.
::efusal to answer cannot ordinarily be justified on the ground tbat it is an

L"'l:Vasion of privacy or that it may tend to disgrace the witness or otherwise
rendsr him Want)us. 21 The ccntrt reuoned that
absolute but must yield to national interests
larger iIl'I9Orta..'"lce.

If

the right to free speech 1e noi

justifiab~

thought

to be of

The same is true of the rif')lt to remain silent.

\';11.en legis-

lating to avert What it believes to be a threat of substantive evil to national
wolrare, Congress IYY abridge either freedoIIl.,"

22

In reaching this decision the court had no less authority than the United

States Coda vihich states. "No witness is privileged to re.tuse to testl.fy to cr:!
!'aat, or to produce any paper, respecting w;hich he shall be examined byeitber
•
House of Congress, or by any committee of either Bouse, upon the ground that hSJ
testinxmy to

l31lCh

.fact or his production of such paper "'laY tend to disgr30e him

or otherwise render him lnfaJlX)us.,,23
The Orman case quoted above and the Federal Code are not so much a denial

of the n€,,ht to privacy as a statement that "when private affairs come into

21201 F.2d. l48 (19,3).

-

22Ibid.

23U. s.C.A. 11192-3.

,30

conflict with the public interest, the latter, and not the
vau. ..

24

ro~r,

must pre-

But there «re ciees, a minoriV to be sure.. which have reached the

opposite concltl.Sion.

In iJnited

~ates v. Crai~ tho court held that a witness

is not bound to answer a question which may" render him. infam::> us, or ma:;,r dis-

grace him. 2$ Justice Jackson, dissenting in Harris v. United States and spealoing of the Fourth A..11lendmnt, said. !tot CO,l.rae this, like each of our constltuti<:mal guaranties, tl.Ut1 often afford shelter' for cri;u1nals. Bl.t-t the fc.refathers
thought this was not too great a prios to pay for that decent fjrivaoy of home..
pap!trs, and effeow which is indispensable to individual dignity and selt-respe t.
They ~ have overvalued privacy, but I

Q'O

not disposed to set at naught their

commamd.,tI26
The fact remains that the rie;hts to privacy" silence a.nd reputation have

ha.d short shrift at the hands ot the

co~·!rts.

We have already seen t hat efforts

to found the privilege upon the Fourteenth A.>nendment were struck down in
~!.1

!!!! Jer8!£.

QI'ld eonsisten~
•
held that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendloont, the Federal Bill of P..ights was a
v.

As we also saw,

th<! courts had

ear~'

limitat.:tnn upon the Federal Goverrment only and n:)t upon the stntea. Therefore
the dofense 1.'1 the !wining case tried to include the FUth Anendment soong the

prlvUeges guaranteed to

.!!! oitizens

by the Fourteenth Amendment.

proach fa:Ued, but another, to F"'J knowledge as

24Applicat1on

2.! Gilchrist"

~"et

This ap-

untried, wh.:i.oh ,n2.€,pt ;rield

221,. NYS 210.

2525 Fed. Cases 114. 88,3. Cf. United States v. Dioldnsol:11 25 Fed. Cases

#14, 953 (1307).
26331 US

145 (1946).

.31
better results would be to baae the refusal to test1i'Y upon the First Amend.'l8nt
guarantee ot freedom of speech and of the press.

The r·J1e has become firm.'l\v

established in the Supreme Court decisons that the riVlts of freedom of speech
and of the press are am:.')!'.g the :t.'unda'l'llental rights and liberties protected by'

the due process clause of the F01..1Tteenth Axoondllant from inpair'me..'1t by the
27
states.
In Soh,seter v. United States it was held that f'reedom. of ~eech and
freedom of the press are stl.Oh intimate elenents of liberty that 'l:.hex'6 is an

instinctive and inst...ant revolt fro'l mt'f limitation of t~ eithor by 1,,1,'1" or
28
a charge under the In.
It has even b~en held by one court that these rights

..

cannot be Inwt-.ilJ.y ,surrendered to another by a citizen, and cannot l.n:fully be
infringed, even tmnentarilyl by individuals alr:! more than b.Y the State itself.

Ravine; tJnm applied the lirirt Am9nd.nJ.ent to all citizens by vlrtue of the
Fourteenth A::oond.nEnt, it oOcl1d than be argued that the liberty to speak or
wi ts inc 1UM3 the COrI'eE;pondine right to be silent or to speak
t.ta;1 £reel;'{ S"~eak..

and that tlucb r:i.f(.hts

P~

on~

,vhen one

ot the s arr.e inviolability as

..
"30
freedom of speeeh, and are insured l.mder t.."'e' same constitutional provisions_
"It would see:i1 that the liberty to remain sUent is correlative to the freedom

to speak.

.

If one must speak, he ca'1not be said to freely speak. ft

This suggested argument holds then that the First Amendll1snt,

n

t1.I'~ike

27!! ~ v. OreSOl'l, 299 US 356 (19.36); Powell v. Alabama,. 237 US

28 251 TlS 466 (1919).

29.Sp~ v. ~teJ

!2s! Lodge,

270 Fa. 67.

JOe!. ~1 Am Jur 1.1.09-10.
3lAtchison,

1. & !. !- !-!- £2.

v.

~ 102 P. 459.

the

45.
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Fifth Amendment, is a 11m1tation upon the sovreignty of the st,at.e:"!. as well as

upon that of the Federal Government, for the Fourteenth Amendnent has been held

to include the First Amendment. It is then proposed that since the rirJtt to
sUeno., is inseparable from the rip;ht to s-peak, tt, too" is part c.t' the First
Amandli8llt and therefore amcmg those rights guaranteed to all oi tizens by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

If this line of re1u;!oning

,.,tud

prevail with the Supreme

Court, it lIOuld have the effect of lending vast. dignity to a privilege that bas
hitherto been regarded as

l"lJre~ It

rule of evidence of dubius worth, and would

r:take it available t.o every citizen in whatever jurisdiction.
But

wh~tever

course the cO',U"t )N\f take at some future date, cert.linly up

to the present time it has not regarded the privilege

&.'3

a natural ridlt.

course the opinion of the

iB

not nooessariJ,.y

corroct.,

It

m~

COttrt..

however instructive,

Of

well be that the ')r1rtlege is in fact a natural right, and so

we would do well to weigh some of the soholastio views on the matter.

Most of the' scholastio authors a1"'$ inolined to base tlte p!'ivilege on the
right to silence,. and of these only onal the.,Italien jur:.tstl fj~aneierl,

cle2I'ly describes it as a natural right.

Several use

langu.~

'hMch, I believe .

can be so inteI?reted.

Father John R., Conner,yJ S.J., Professor of
College, has recentl1 traced the

leading moralists since

st.

d~velopment

Tho'lU8$ Aquinas.

have alWC\Y's agreed that no one was bound to

l"r~l

Theology at West Baden

of thought on this point by the
Father Connery finds that looral1sti

~onf'ess

a completely hidden or

occult crime. 32 This rir)lt found expressio1'} in the COmnDn law of England with

33
the trial

at John Lilburn, where it was held that no one could be interrogated

except b'<J indictment, and that one

eo~)~d

not be indicted unless there were 81-

rea<tr som evidence Broad indicating guilt. 33 Thus the crime was not a hidden
Once legitimatel,v introduced into the courtroom the defendant must ansnr

one.

truthfull..y a legitimr..e question put to him by one in authority.

Bt..~

what con-

stitutes • legitimate question has been the subjeot of dispute over t.'1e centuriE ~
and the opinion favoring restriction of the tlU9stion

By the end of' the siXteenth centu.r:r it

~rea

has .round increasing

was cOnDidered a

so1i~

probable

opinion that at least where the death sentence awaited the dei'endant l he would
not be obliged to give a direct answer to

gullt.

and

judge \'IhtJ questioned him abotrt his

Several arguments were used to s1lpport this opinion, and the language

emplo.1ed indicates that this
itseUI:

til

objectionabl~

investigatian is against nature

"The main argu.·nant seemed to be that a law

acco~dated

to human weakness;

only to burden consciences.

othe~,

'lhasa moralists:

go

sho'~':1d

be hUJ!l.an1y possible

it is a useless law and serve«
on to say- thllrli vm oannot expect

a man who knows that he would not otherwise be condemned to provide the testlmony necessary' for his conviction. Moral theologians also argued that no one
should be obliged to cooperate in his own punishment.
they found

thft

court summons.

Going back to St. Thomas,

working on this principle he allowed a criminal to evade a

He also allowed a condemned criminal to escape from jai11f he

oould do so without violence.

re8$on-~~--$_aame

These theologians saw no

"
",
'.

33.1lomll, State ;t'rials, In, 1315 (1637).

\

.J W €" L"o
'~~

LC~YOIA

U'J'VER51'Y

principle could not be applied to

Ii

direot

.34
question rdgarding guil~.n34

The ahove reasoning was even mre strildngl3' phrased by the Italian,

FilaTlt7ieri, who elear4r il!q)l.ies tl'la"" the privilege is

Ii

natural rightt

IIl~ature.

whose laws are mrs ancient than the obscure and violent ordinances of legis-

lators; nature, which never contradicts itself in its dispositions, and which
in creating the body and the mind of man, has created invariably lavs which

oUJ!)lt to direct him} nature, which manifests its laws only by its

i!1stir~ctive

movements 1i'!1ich draw all man toward good at every lloment of their 11ves-this
same nature closes the !ll)uth or the guilty nan when the judge questions him
about the t .."Uth of the acousation brol:lght agail'lBt him. tt35

For the defendant is faced with this dilemmlU the adm:i.ssion of Guilt w:tll
entail either 'the

10S8

of. 111'e or at least a part of the good.

nIt

t;~erefore

demands either an ef'f'ort superior to the contrary natural impulse, or a.n illusion Which sees in the loss of' one (')f these two things the aequisiticn of

In the one case the

nora preciolls good.

l~gislator

demands. • .what is

t.l

mum

lIDr~

~sSible; in the second case, he accepts •. -•• the st.atement of an :insane

person, of a man wi'lO ls in the same menta.l condition as a Suicide, who cuts
himself" off from life with his own hands because he believes that thro·,lgh the

loso o:f' existence, he ":ill find , source of hap;>ineas or reach the end of his

woes.,,36

34corn1err, 132-)•
.35rlet/f Problems in Medical. EthiCS, ad. 'Peter Flood.. O.S.B., (7~"'land, 1955 ,.

n.lla=9.'

-

36Ibid. 119.

-

35
Thus Filangieri concludes that the law is obliged to a ttaoh no signifioan

to the admissions of the accused, for a

co~l.etel;r

'Il8eless

te5t1l!D~

which is kno1m to be falsified by nature itself. New York State has

is one
recen~

followed the same course declaring that no man can be oOnvicted on his own

oonfession alone.37
The right to sUenoe was based by FUangieri upon the usel.essness of the

ooerced testitoorv.

other writers base the right upon the inviolability of the

personal secret. They argue that ever,y individual possesses a private and
wholly personal domain, and apart !'rom definite cases provided by In, he has

the right to rejeot arq

atte~t

to infringe upon it.

The uselessness argument of Filangieri considers

O"l~

the case in whioh

the defendant is questioned about his guilt, overlooking the rrru.ch more oomnnn
situation in which the acoused is questioned on the material details which will
serve as pointers, perhaps against hinself', but whieh smce they are essenti
verifiable, will allow the judge to establ+sh a conviotion nth greater pre•
eision. "It cannot, theI'Cili'ore, be repeated.-too often. • • that the oonfessioa
of the accuaed 1.s neither an element of conviction nor an eleDBnt ot pt'l."')of "hi

can be cleciSive in • criminal case. . . . . But real questioning of the aoeused
is a different matter.

Ita object is to search for objective elements of in-

formation, and in this form it is both necessary and legiti:mate.,,38
A current and celebrated murder is • case in point. Three years ago •
Dr. Samuel. Sheppard was tried and convicted of the murder of his idfe. He

T.

31Pe?ple. v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 59~J the same 16 true in nllnois, Bart:!!l
Peop!i, 358 DOL 5r7J People v. "lasser, WX" Ill. 265.
38nood,.. 120.

never ceased to protest his innocence.
Florida created
Sheppard.

Q

Three years Ja tel' a young telon in

sensation by asserting that he was the murderer of Marilyn

His mre confession, however, was wot-thless; it was his replieD to

detailed and efwentially verifiable questions that betrayed his innocence or
g1.liltl what type

ot vreapon?

How n't8l\V blows?

How did you dispose of the club

and the 0100<1:1'" clothes?39

The other baE.:is often used to defend the right to silence, in t.i.e claim of
a

li13!l

to his oa(;rete. This, too,

enoU€')1, it does not. l)rove
It is
natural

11\1 .:n'fll

rit~t

~

Vie Il'J.St

reject 'because it does not prove

h<l is entitled to his secrets.

belle! that the ll)!st cogent argument that can be made for the

theory is to be found in the conclusions that can be dran from

the traditional teaching on datl'aetion and the risht to one's p;ood reputation.
Detraction is the injurious attack upon the reputation of another through
t.he unjust revelation of his hidden crin»9 or detect.

in that vmat is sdd is actually true.

De~etion

It differs f1'OM cal1.ll1lJT

is al"q8 a sin. rortalor

venial d~Emding upon the gr;v1ty of' the _tter revealed.,

it weak--en.8 or destroys

anot..~er's

it unduly difficult, i f not

It is

Q"

sin beoause

eood reputation, without which he will find

~ss1bl.e,

to obtain the end

:);f

his existence.

Not only 15 a third party precluded from revealing the hidden sins ad
crimes of another. but as tar as the natural 1_ is concerned, ltllJ)ralists have
had trod:lle even establishing the liceity

July

or

-

-

sel1'-defamation. 1t40 A .........................
fortiort

20, 1957, 1.

S.J., ~rallt'tJ and the Fifth All'Isndnmt_" The -................
Catholic
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the m1.scrG2l1t has the right, if not the duty, t.o I'9nw.in silent.

ThAt this is

a natural riGht seems to tollow .from the flmOtlon of, a good reputation.
God created man to acquire a certain .fixed end which he will aohieve by
leading hio life according to the Divine Will as made Im01lll to M,m by reason
and revelation.

Thus he has

It

is necessary to live that ille

r undamntal right to his life and whatever else
accordin~

to its proper nature.

A,"ld since man

is a gregarious being" he has an inalienable right to ..mataver is required to

live an ordinary social life.

Bnt a good reputation is an elemnt at least

morally necessary tor such a lite, and so man has a na1ntral right to his good
naroo" as well as the right to refrain from revealinp, whatever 'Would weaken
thtt good name..41

Thj.s ref'Bon1ng seems
tion is wrong and

rair~

defensible and certainly explains why detrac-

wIv the malefactor has no ::!uty to accuse

hi:~lSeU"

"f his cr1ne

But "rl.ll this defense hold against an :tnvest1gation launched by the State? Doe:
a criminal stand in the same relatlon to
rir,hts are unimpaired?

~

State as an innocent man whose
•
If so how does this ,ttitude of silence square with

the traditional mral teaoh1ng that the defendant must respond to a legitimate
question asked by one in authorityl And how does it squarn with a recent
allocution of Pius IlIon the problem of punishment?42 fhis problem hae itc
beginning at the IlX>1nmt when a man becorr..es a criminal and is a reaction, required by law and justice. to the crime.

The violated social order must

r.>8

restored and it is the task of law and ,justice to re-establish the :::)l"oper har-

4lJ • J • Farraher, S.J •• P,etract.!g, !!. ~ ~ Famam (Rom, 1952), 16
~pe Pius XII.. "Discourse to the Catholic Jurists of Italy.. tt Catholic
pocumenta, XVII, April.. 19".
..
..

38

ttPun1shmel1t

p~"Oper'l¥ so-ca~"Led

'!ihe law who has yt::i.thJran fl"Om it.

oannot, therefore, have any other

l~

This order of duty is neoessarUy an ex-

presd..on of ·;Jle order of being, of the order or the true and the p;ood, i7h:ich

;:llono has the rieht of existenoe, in opposition to error and evil, which stand
for that which STu

~'.ld

not erist. ,,43

The error ':"'' 1d \:"i1 of which

~:Lie

Pius is spe..king here is the unpun:1.shed

s·tate :'d:' the crlmimu, " state whIch docs not automatioal.J¥ cease
co:i1p1e~d.

itsel.t' is
violated.
alty.
0':1

it

"He remains tho

~:lP.n

'imo has oonsoio'.lSly and

"~B

11 t.he aot

del.1.herate~

Ilt'ti which binds him, ane 8:'i.nnJltnIleo'llsly he is involved in tho pen-

This pETsonal condition enmtres, ;)oth in his relation to -the authority

which he oo;;)E)llds, or better" the human authority of public law in so far .,

this has a share in the correspondinr; penal prooess .. and at

a'~

t:tlOOS also, in

his relation to the sllpreme dh"1ne allt..horit-y. 'l'husthere io brouGht about an
enduring

cC~ldition

of

~uiJ..t

"

and punishment vdttch ir.dicatce a def:1nite state of

the ;:;tlilty party in the e:/es of the authority offended, and elf this authority
wi.th rea,ect to the gnilty party.nL.4
Our IIol,y Fathar concludes with the stf.lte~nt that "the culprit's
per;~,a?s e~J'en

''1Vffi

good,

::;ore so that of the C0ID!11ID1ty, demands that thd 2.Uing ;oori:.)cr be-

c(ne sound Qr:tin• • • • Deliverance from gu:ut must therefore

rein"~t:rate

the

39

relations disturbed by the culpable aet. ft45
It seems clear from the foreg\"d,uG that 0:1.1' Pontiff considers the uIlpun1ahe
st~te

;)f

the crim..Ll'uil as

Q

blizht upon tho social orderI that .i..t.

~U1S

to its exi.stence, and that the disrupted balance mtlst be restored.

aga:i.n. ft

no right

The r;:ey

If this is so, how can ym speak of a crimi..."1&!l's righ'l.i, 11..4.s natu.l"al

rlr::ht to sUencG,. or of t..b.e rleht to defend his obnorlo1..ls state ovan ti1('1-:.gh
COtmter to his own good and that cf the cor:nnunity1
We can

hidden

aSSUt"ile

Crill'e,

here that the Holy Father is not spea~d.ng of a cOrl!::)letely'

1)ut of

o~

which t.:'1a State has knowledge.

unknown crime, the State as such suffers no inj1.l17.

For in a completely

There may also be room for

that other distinction betvmen eapital?un.ishment and incarcer::rt.1on for a
per5.od of years.. thus saving the l'?olldJ;l' :c)l"f)hahle opir.ion "tb.st at

the deat.h sentence awaited the defendant
direct answer to

It

1'".16

vrould not be c,bllged to

judge who questioned him about hi:':'

[~uil t ••46

le;,~t
G:iv~

uhere
n

With these

Q:\'Cc]::rtions I think it is clear that the )1.i.screantts right to his r9?UtatiOll is
a linrlted one and yields to the higher :':'ight of the State to seek evidence

"Vihieh will assist

i'~

in the proper pursuit of its duty--the maintenance of

justioe and order.
Anot.h.ar argument that the privile,::,e a.gai.llst self-:l.nerimination is not a
natural ri.ght is dr:rwn from a rapid, and b:r no means exhaustive, reviErn'
other jurisdictions where the oi.rili?jation and culture are as advanced

-,-------_......_,-46conner.r,

BThe Right to Silence,"

132.

or
QS

our

40
own.

1\1'01."'$

the pr1vllege a natural riGht y,"e would E!jtpect to find it at least

amng tJ1e m!'e ellllgh-OO.nod codes '0; criminal procedure.

nov",r f:aine1

fI11GS

i'a~tor

Holrovor the privilege

on the European continent, not even

a.."1t>rl;:'

those

COUll-

tries which prido thdlWalves on their de:mcratic and liberal proclivities.
has r.over been allowed to Dec"me a part of theil" jurisprudence or

cedures.
acter in

Do

cl"'im:bt;l iTl\"'estigation shou.ld be permitted to remm.n entirely mute

to\

crime, an effort 'Vrl1ich

highly il1og1ciaJ.., 41 Yet despite the denial
1m

pro-

To the peoples 'Of those nations, the notion -Ghat the principal char-

ing th.fl solution '01

as

C0').rt

It

chD'Ose

to call it"

whD

rrequent~

in

proves futile, seelDS

thes0 lands of this basic right,

will say tJ.'1at the systems of justice prsYn:tl1ng 1I'l

Fl'/.Ulce, Iioll:md, Sweden.. or West

C'i:~rl'l<'1ny ;:U'f~

inferior to curs, 'Or

~.

less fair,

just, or humatlo?,thB
The Code JllE, H.man is r-egarded as one 'Of the greatest acr.ievcments in l11story, whiJ..e the law it cc,difiad

lIst according to RorJ;Qn

1.,,, a

WQE i'lnd

r e~:!.ns 'the glory of

tJle

ltoMan people•

•

judge was allcrwed to PLtt a direct qllestion to a

defendant regarding guilt 'whenever (l) he was tmder inf'UW tor the crir::e,
or (2) when t..1Jere ..ras clear evidence, or (3) 'when • sem1.-o(J~lete ?roo.f could

41uIt. oho:l.d be observed however, t..~at while European ;;iToceclure ')el..m:tts
lind stresses the judicial examinat10n of the acoused, he is under no legal
co~u1s1on to tmm101'." Selected t'r::. tings on the Lm of Evidence and Trial~
ed. wUUam f .. fryer (s!£. Pill!, !9s1), ~lt' -sGIIsO'J::lI'Osoow, I!he &ftJ.opmont of Present-D~ Criminal Procedu:r.es in Europe and !merica, It llal"'VClrd Law
ftev:tew. XLVIII, 433, Hogg, ttrnmch Crlmtnal Procec1ure,,·' Canada
~
~..l.u. (19h5), tl4b.

!!f

4~ichard C.. Baker, "Sel.f-Inc1":i.:n1nationf Is the Mvilege an .in(1chronism?tt
.!!t .,.sociatlop 1oUl'!!!t mI, 634.

.!::!.r~

U
be br:::

"v-~;

against the defendant. 49 The privilece against salf-i."lcri.r:ti.nation

is conspicuous by' its absence from this ond other codes..
Vi:tth regard to Oanon Law, the noted constitutionalist Edrtin COI'W'ln writes.

"l am. assured by Father Louis Motry of the Catholic University, vIho is a recognized

authori~

--

in the field, that no text of canon law contai. ns the

the maxim and this assurance is

conti~d by •

iPle

!:! £2S!. ~

Cmonique. • • _ The Canon Law has always reoognized the general 9r1noi.-

that a man shoul.d not be requl.:red to accuse himself

att.enuated by the qualifioation that one accused by
~r

of

careful examination of Gravinats

Institlltiones CanonS.Ne; Pithouts Corpus Jur'i:! Canonic!, and Cmcets
~it

l"""ol~ds

It

!!: ~ first

instance,.

sutticientl¥ authenticated

could be legitimately required to clear his roputation or have the eharp

rtaken as COnfessed.,1t !70
In recent times the AlIerican Hierarchy submitted to IJNESCO a "Declaration

Iof H~ Rights.nS'l

This document emurerates the basic rights of 'the indiv.idu-

tr of States.

al, the fam.i.ly.. the State.. and the conttmmi

Inc.1.u.ded are the rights
•
to vrorlr.., collective bargaining., just w8!?,eJ bttt nothing is said of Q r:4~ht not to

incriminate oneself, although eighteen rights of the h1l:'lml porson are coi'1ned.
Since we

h~

$2

now established, or hope we have., that the privUe:\e is not

a natural riP-Jlt, hnw then did it come into being?

For tho answer

1re

rlust pic-

49S.T.. II-n, q. 69, .. 2.

~dwin
Clause, tt

B. Corwin, "The Supr<:H;e Court Construction of t:i6 Self'-IncriIninatio:
Mic¥:sam 1!!! Hen_" XXXIX (NoveIlber.. 1930),. 3.

;)lA.merican Hierarchy, "Declaration of HUlI'.I8n Rights,· ~e Catholic ~
XLV (April, 1947), 193.
5211'01" an interesting comparison~ cf'. United Nations, "Universal BUl of
Human. Uibhts,." .!!. !_ Bulletin,. VI.. o.

ture u.,u .;k;.L.VeS at a crlrninal

trial.

Th" defendant is being :ilsked some em-

barrassing questions about a recent theft.

To the oonsternation oJ: all he

refuses to reply' even thoU€'ll he has been warned that he must answer. A deadlock (,nsues.

Prosecu.tion knollS that the defendant (or vdtness as the case 1llIV

be) is hiding som pertinent inform.Qtion vital to the trial..

the !l!'Osecutor

probab~

~)oint

surrenders to the overpowering urge to extract a con-

fession, and lacking the Injro subtle

OOTl!l:loS

of today, he llright have resort

instead to the equally effective rack or 1m-Jut.

Now it was

vent this sort. of thing that the privllege was introduced,
pollcy £ormuJ.ated

At this

~}reciSe~r to pre~

L?Jatter of

~.lUblle

'b7 an enlightened social conscience -much began to denounce

and decry such methods.

But it did not

defendant's natural right to sUenos.

1mpl3' 1l%\V implicit recognition of the

It was rather an er.tl.if)ltened rule of

procedure designed to conilat the e:ct.rems of the dIl:!, but of
value in our own tiloos 'When t."1.e dan[;er::>f torture is so

.,

.

consj.dal"ab~

l"elOOte •

less

Sidney Hook, Professor ot PhilosoMr at ColUDbia University'.

recent~

stated that he knows of no one who urges the abrogation of the ruth
'th1a is rather surprising, tor

Emm

'1

A!lltnldlEnt.~

a cursory check on legal articles written

on the subject reveala a deep and sooldering opposition to the A'n.8l1dnant amidBt
This opposition, at least in its 1!X)re virulent torm,

the legal. profession.

dates .from. the time

ot

Bentham, and evidence of its yet vigorous 11fe can be

found in the latest issue of the ...
Am.;.;,.;,o;;.rlc.;;;.;.;;an_ !!! Asaociatiop Jo~

ltv purpose here is to ventilate

the controversy in an effort to reach an

intelligent, inf'orz.d conclusion as to the merits of the Amendm&nt and itD
suitabil.11#7 in mdera America.
-'

Opposition to the priv1lege is often tr.-d in the torm o:t a dUenna. i f
i

the :}rivil.ege is for the benefit of the innocent,

tor the benefit of the guiltT,
letting them

~e

~

do

they'

~

do they need it? Or if'

desel!'V9 it? What is the poj.nt of

this privilege i f they are indeed gu1J:~?

This does

present a 'll"Oblem, tor it the guilty do not deserv-e the privilege, and the
innocent do not need it, then what is it doing in the Constitution at all?

.

. I

This is a difficult question a.Yld one which fOl'Cl3s us to reappraise the

rea

function of the .Amen.drnent. By going to the cases we discover that its purpose
is "to protect the innooent members of society' at large from :mcalled tor in-

vasions of privacy which lIIOuld attend the use of indiscriminate pEtriod:1c inquisitions by the prosecutor as a maans of discovering 'Whether crinDs migh:t

have been conmdtted. ..... .A. second stbsid1ary purpose of the privilege• • • is
the protection of the innocent from. the coercive measures of the O"V9r-Zealoua
pollee officer.

It ervery man has his ;1rice, so every man has his breaking

point, the point where it is easier to eive the interrogator the answer he
seeka than

to insist upon the truth.lf2

Clearly,then, this constitutional privilege grol'lS out of the high regard

or

our jurisprudence for conducting crinriDal trials and investigatory pro-

ceed1:ng. upon a plane at dignity, hUl'lll1'11ty,. and impartiality'. It is designed

to prevent the use of legal. process to force from the lips of the accused the
evidence necessar;r to convict him, or to

an:r

f~rce

him to produce and authentiCate

personal doC'W18nt.a or effects that might·, incrim1nate him.

'.
PIwsical
torture

or ather less violent but equally reprehensible nDdes ;>f cont>elling the

pr0-

duction of incrim1nating evidence are thereby' avoided. "The imediate m:td
potential e'V'll.a of oompulsory self-disolosure transcend a:s:r:r dif:f'icu1tias that
the exel"Cise of the pr1v1lege m.1W impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crilne. ihUe the privilege is subject to aiJuse Qtld misuse, it 1s
t:i.rmly enbedded in our constitutional and

the iniquitous methods of prosecution.

~ gal

frameworks as a bulwark against

It proteots the individual from . ,

45
disc1osure~

in the form of oral testimolV~ docwoonts, or chattels sought by'

legal process against him as a witness.- 3

I.ord Caman, in 1765, stated the phllosoplxr behind the nrivilege we later
embod1&d in our 'Uth Amndment in these vor&u

"It is very certain that the

law obl1geth no man to accuse himseltJ because the necessary

n88M

of compel-

ling self-accu;s-ation, falling upon the in..l1Ocent as well as the guUty, would

be both cruel and unjust. "4
A simtlar

at+~tude

haa been adopted by the American courts where the

privilege has been described as "tllle of the g,reat landmarks L'"l man's struggle
to make h1mselt

ci~

It is the handmaid of the abolition of torture, and

has its roots deep in tweltth eent1.ll7 legal thinld.ng.

Its fundamental. thesis

is that you can.'"lot extract evidence from. one charged \rl th a crime on 'Which to

convict him.

It is contrary to every prinolple of legal

philoso~

to coerce

one to reveal M.s guilt.ItS
~ltzer~ writing

in the Uni·.rel1l::t.ty of Chicago Law Review, defends
•
the Amendment upon different grounds, for he believes that "the privilege at
Bernard

the trial st4tge today is not the hulwark of the innocent, not the barrier

against torture, and not the spur. of the pollee.
lavr's unwillingness to command the

~ssible,

It is the reflection of the

of its l"spect for the In of

seJ.r""Preservation invoked by L1lhurn. It is also perhaps a renectlon of a
humane attitude Tlh1ch

1I1IITeS

ewn the guilV from a harsh choice IIIDng perjury.

lumted state! v. 1hite, 322 US 694, 152.ItR 1202 (1943)

~tick v. Carr~on.

~;t!ton

Howell,

~tate

v. state. 75 So.2d. 2ll.

Trials, XIX" 1029.
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reoalcitrance, or confession..6
A lJk)re practical approach has been taken by S1r John ' . Stephen who ob-

-

served that those in old England who found themselves faced with the "ex
officio'
oath denounced it as contrary to the law of God and the 1_ of nature,
,
while they considered the maim

".!!.t!? tenet!ll"

wlth both t."le las of God and nature.

aeiew! P1"2S!!!- to be in accord

ttThe real truth,- SU Stephen

asserts.

"Was that tho.. who disliked the oath had u.suall.y done the things oflflich they

ware accused. It1 Although Sir stephen thus finds the privill ge highl;r adv~
tageous to the guilty', be 'WOuld retain it as contributing great,'4r to the dig-

at.

nity and apparent humanity of a criminal trial. U1a mst coq>elling argument.
however. is reached after •

of sewn trials, foUl" English and three

French. In FNnch oourts the defendant oould be questioned, in the English he
could not. Sir stephen found that "in every one of the English cases the
evidence is fulJ.er, olearer, and inf1niteq

IlDrG

cogent than it is in any one

time was occupied by the
•
English trials than by the Fremoh ones, and not a word was said or a step t4.ken
of the French oases, notwithstanding which

whioh ll\V'one can represent.

U

~ar 1$88

o1"1J81 or undignit1e4,8 One wonders, though,

.,mather seven cues is • fair sarq:>l.:i.ng and whether all other factors had been

elinttnated.
a,ving upon lOOre :mdem times
~onvention

we find that the New York Constitutional

Colmllittee,. after uldng • thorough atuC\v of the privilege, drew up

6aernard Jleltur,. "Required Records, the ~arron Act, and thtIJ Privilege
~ainst Self....Incrimination.tI? Univ. of Chicaco ~ Revie.!f". XIX, 687.

1John F. Stephen.. !l1sto,!Z .2! ~ Crim1n~ Law. as quoted in Wiglmre,. 3l3.

-

albic:!.
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• comprehensive list of ita advantages.
(1) One purpose of' organized societ:'r is to secure to each ci'~izen his
right to privacy. The constitutional clause inhibiting self-incr1m:l.nltory
testi1lV)~ is directed to this end.

(2) The existenoe of the privUege cOl".ters upon the criminal trial-and

tor that matter, upon fJ!81"1' investigatory proceeding-an aspect of

dig-

nity, h1llllaniW, and ifl\Jartilll1ty which the contrasted inqu:tsitoI'ial.
process 18 too apt to lack• • • • It is agreed with Hallam that the prin.
lege is a "generous maxim" of our law. generous to t.~e 'Witness and to
the accused.
(3) The priv:Uege also serves as a discipl.i.rlary measure d1rected against
the legislature and legislative 1rrvestigatory commissions. Since• • • it
is • barrier betwen the individual whose selt-incriminatory testimttr is
sought and the power of the government to ob:bain his testinDIW, it precludes the cOMtitutionality ot Q!\V' 1_ which attempts to authorize 1q'
type of discovery proceeding without also providing an inmuniV or amnesty to the test1t.ring witness. Therefore antecedent to the adoption ot
any such 1ft) there aJ.wlo\V8 is required a balancing of interests-whether
the benefits to be obtained by procuring the testimn;y of criminals wouJ.d
be greater or less then the evils which would follow from exempting them
forever :£rom proseoution for the crimes disclosed by their testinnru.
Thua the people va spared ill-considered legislation purporting to
authorise ECqJeditionary proceedings and investigations that un be instituted tor no other purpose than to appease grouPs, satisi"y curiosity"
or harass the unpopular.
(4) !he privilege serves to stimulate ~?roeecuting officers to an independent search tor evidence• • • • In tbe absenoe of the privileee,
prosecuting attorneys might, not unnaturally.. re:i¥ on the opportnnity to
obtain the defendmtfs testinDl\Y at the trial; they might, simillilr~·,
abate their s.arch for independent evidence J there is thus good reason to
tear that the prosecution would try to prove its case sole J;r through the
accused., An ofticer in India once expressed this tendency on the part of

prosecuting officers as followst 'It is far pleasanter to sit comrortabl\v

I

I

in the shade rubbing red pepperin~ the poor devilla eyes than to go
about in the sun hunting evidence."
In proof that this danger of coll¥>ulsion is
~

scarce~

less real today than

colonial Ind1. the reader is referred to the famus and shocking case of a

Pew

years ago wherein the defendantfs home had been raided without werr;.mt, and

~77-8.

~rt of th4 L_ Revision COIllDi8slon, State of New York (New York, 1942)
---

Ii

~O

protect h:tmeeli' he nal101ftld several capsUles of dope that were on his bed-

~t,and.

The oapsules 'Were later extraoted by a st::lmach pump and used in evidence

~ainat

the defendant. Speaking for the oourt, Justioe Frankf'urter declared,

!tIt is conduct that shooks the oonsoience.

nlegaJ.ly breakine into the pr-ivacy

)! the petitioner, the struggle to o'gen r.is r.Duth and remove what was there .. the
~orcible

~ents

ext.raotion of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by

of gsvemment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensi-

~ilit1.e8.

They are lOOthods too olose

to the raok an.d the screw to permit of

onstltutional differentiation• • • • Nothing cOlJld be more oalcu1ated to disredit law and thereby brutalize the ten;>er of a society.ttlO
Thus far we haw oonsidered abot.."t as strong a defense of the privilege as
can be round

~ere.

It is now

tL~

to hear the adVocates of abolition. the

foreQ)st of -mom is Jeremy Bentham, the great legDJ. and sooial reformer of
another centu.ry..

nearly

tNeT"J

His opinion takss on great signifioance ll'lEm

reform which he ohampioned for

~-the

Tre re~kllie

that

law of evidence came jio pass

.,

within three generations.
as presumptive

evid~nce

"We might

alJ~nst

regard his eonderltnation of an:; rule

of its ultitmte downfall. ell

Aquinas-like.. Bentham net up the best defense of the pI'ivi]ege that he
cc.)lcl, and then proceeded

tiC demo~ish

it with his ridicule and reason. The

first was "the C)ld mJ!'l.3ll's reason,," which could be smll"led up in the one word

"hard."

It is Ithardlt upon

8,

man to be obUged to iner1mi.nate himself.

too is punishmant, observes Bentham,. 'tlut no one has

10n0ch~ v.

f'eoele 2!

u.vigunre., 3Oh.

S Ut,,;gested ~

California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952).

So

as a suf'....
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£1c1ent reason for destroying pruOl1s.
'the second defenae 1s the ftfoXr-hunter's reason, It 'Which feels that the 1_
should be at least as handicapped _ the hounds. That the defendant should be
giVen a sporting chance in the sam sense as in a contest is patently absurd
and

sure~

must find little support beyond the limited circle of anti-

vivisectionists.
The third defense, and the last with which 'We will be concerned, is

iavored by those 'Who confound interrogation 'With torture.

Bentham d.ecla res

that "the act of putting a question to a person whoee station is that of defe
dant in a cause, is no

nDl'e

an act of torture than the putting

t~e

same ques-

tion to him 'WOuld be if instead of being a defendant, he were an extraneous
witness. ihatever he chooses to slq, he is at full liberty to say• .,12
This contusion of interrogation with torture is cOJWuon even today.

Griswold in\>lies in his little book that witho 1.1t the ruth
be exposed to the pol1ce methods of the
~

.A:mi.mdm.~ nt

to~lltar1an state.l3

Dean

l'le wo u1.d

"If we are not

•

to 19 t the .-ndment be i.nvoked" where over ti_ are ... going to stop

when police and prosecutors or chairman want to get people to talkZ tf14
Does the Dean

rea~

think that this privilege is the only" defense lett to

the defendant aga1nst the unbridled power of the State? If so. '&hat happens

those instances where the defendant is held to have waived his privilege

against the Fifth

Ame~nt?

Is he now tortured, herrasaed and badgered?

•

12Jerellff Bentham,. !ationale
IX. Part IV, Chap. III, ~29.

Griswol~

.2! Judicial
..

F,videnc~ (London, 1821), V, Bk.

'

!h! Fifth AlOOndment Tec!!l (Cani1ridge, 1950).
l4oriswold.. !!!!. Fifth Amandl!ent T0!!!l, as quoted by Hook, 58.

l3srnest

Certainly not; nor would he have been had the privilege never been his in the
first plaoe.

For under our present system of trial procedure in an orderly

courtroom, with defense counsel always prssant, the danger of torture is td.mpl;y'
so remote that it can be utterly discounted. Therefore to link tortu:re w1th
interrogation is to introduce an anachronism which will gain 11ttle credence

among the sober-minded.
Professor Viigmre made a nice distinction in his rep1-,v to the above argur.entB of Bentham.. He pointed out that Bentham had failed to distinguish be-

tween interrogation 'Of an individual betore tndietnent, and the questioning ot
an accused ,!f'ter indictment.
So essential in the

]a tter

WiglOOl"e

seems to agree that the privilege is not

case but certainly is in the formr.

Questioning

without ind:totnent was the t"'!-,use that first gave birth to the ortvUer;e, for

it

sign! ties an examination on mere suspiCion without prior presentment or other

formal accusation.
It is Professor Wigmore's fear that

s~h

a system is certain to be abused.
"

In confirmation of this he rllight have referred to a fairly recent book on

Constitutional La. Its author found that "the privilege does not protect
against third-der,r&e coercion. Third-degree torture is one of the disgraces

ot the United Statu. It takea

many- ditferettt toraH fk)l1l!ti"!l8s it

consists ot

threats • • • solitary contineutent• • •whipping or the use of boxing gloves • • •
rubher hose. • • water cure, etc.

If there i8 anythi.."1g that the

~ ccused

ought

to be protected against it is third-degree oompul.sion as practiced by the
police of the United States. Yet the :)rivilege against selt-incrimination will

not avail a poor victim in the hands

or

the police.

A technical reason given

is that the protection 1s waUa"a onl,y in • criminal prosecution and that at

the time third-degree practices occur there is not yet any oriminal prosecu-

tion • .JS
Since such practices can nourish now with the Fifth Amendment, so too
they could and would without the Fifth Alnendment.

But in both cases outside

The solution then lies not 1.n the Fifth Amendment, but in

the courtrrom,.

those steps which will utterly eaclude forced testinnny from the courtro01'l1t tIl

eUminating all incentive for the use of third-degree methods.
Bentham found the privilege unneoessrary and an impeclil:nent to justice at
the trial stage,
trial stages.

80

he sought to eliminate it tram

~

the trial and the pre-

Professor Wigmore found the privilege absolutely' essential at

the pre-trial (pre-1nd:tctment)

sta~,

implied that it wasnot too i~rtant at

the t1'1.a1 ataeo and yet concluded that it should be rettined in both. Did
neither perceive the possiblity of retaining the prlviJe ge at the pr&-trial

sta!!,o so t hat no one

Q)

uld be questioned without indlctlllmtJ but once the State

had shown sufficient causa for i."dictmant, ~ then the accllsed

'WO uld

be question

at his trial, under the orderly sur>erv1sion ()! the judger?
The

A~rlcan

Law'Institute in its Model

~

2! _Ev:!
......_den
__...ce_.•

seellV3 to support

this view, fo!" there it is uidt "If we assume the continuance of trio1 by an
i~artial

j11'rj"" before • competent :fudgs in publiC, it 1.s dif'ficult to under-

stand how an accused represented l:1jr
by being required to testtiY.

prosecutor but he can

l~.

~

co~etent

cC;ll1sel can be 11nfair~v'treated

He may need protection against })Olice and
need 'Orotectior. against judge and jury vdlose

E. Willls, Constitutional Law of the United st.tes (Bloomington,

1936), 52J..

' -

- -

, ,
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action is subject to review by an appellate court.,.l..6
Professor Wigz!ore finds another fatal and fundamental error in Bentham's

positiont

"Any s,rstem of adminstration which permits

habitually to

co~uJ.sor,v

~~e

prosecution to trust

self-disclosllre as a l"lO'JI'Ce of proof 7:ID.3t itself sutfe

mr:a1l,v thereby. • • • The

~le

a.nd

~ef!ll

process of q uestioni.ng breeds a

readiness to r eBort to bullying and to physical forae and torture.. • • Thus
the legitimate use grows into the 'tmjust abuse.

For the sake then, not of the

guilty but of the innocent acoused and of conservative and healthy principles
of judicial conduct, the privilege shouldb e preserved. Hl7
Wignnre admits that the defendant 1s the

r.~~~t

fertUe s,)urce of. informa-

tion, but insists that if we quiz' him under oath our system of justioe vdll
decay .and crumble.
e~irio,

As the professor oonfesses elaewhere, his

RrgUJl'lSnt

is

and therefore open toibe fallacy of mistaking _ mere aooidenta.l

association for a c~. And I th:tnk that that is just what he has done, for I

see no necessary connection between compulsor,v self-disclosure and the decay of
the administration of justice.

It seems safe· to say that interro:;ation .alone

would result in conviction in only a mir.ority of cases, which leaves the

department plenty of room for legwork to keep up its roral fibre.
After all. i.£ the evidence of the defendant alon3 is suffiCient to convict
him, why sho,;ld the prosecuting attornsy be sent scurrying aoo1,.>t seekine
additional evidence.

With a

~

wave engulfing the countl"".f, we would do well

to do all we can to expedite trials rather than impede them. 1hreover the

16

American La Institute, ~del.E2.2!..2! Evidence (Philadelphia, 1942), 130.

17wigzoore, .308.
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proseont:1nff attorney can never be sure just what information he will be able

to extract .from the defendant, and so he cannot attord to gamble the success
of his case and his reputation on this one source of iJ'l.formation, if others are
also avai1alrle to him.
A nrofesoor of law at Chicago University has studies this "lazy p7.'osecutor" argu.mant and finds that it 1tslights some 1.:mportant consideration:::, such as
the necessity of showing probable cause before the trial is i:rl.tiated; the

reluctance of prosecutors, intent on their record of convictions, to rely on
the possibUity' of the defendant's convicting bimseJ.f; the tact that effective
interrogation presupposed careful investigation; and the fact that, the most
(·~retul

investigation may be ineffective without interrogation of the suspect.

Moreover, it

?l~

down the protection provided for the defendant by the court

and counsel. .18

I

It. frontal attack ns made upon the .mendment in 1910 by the Wisconsin

branch of' the .!m!rican Ir!stitute of

Crirrln~

believed that ttthe p%'1)vision
of
,

Constltuilon that tWo 'Oerson shall be

0'1.11"

Law and Criminology.

This body

~

cowpelled in 8l\V criminal case to be a witness against himself" has

~n\.·'~l~_ved

its usefulness, and should he abolished, and that t.i.ereby one hlding-place of

crima would be destroyed. .19
The N_ York Constitutional Convention, besides

the Fifth Amendment, drew up

.8~t
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Meltser, 687.

19Qu.oted in Wigmre, ,313.

of grievancest

~tst1ng

the adv<:lntages of

I

(1) The privilege is a h.1.ding !llace for crime. Overwhelming oiftloulties
cOnf'ront the government today in the detection and prosecution of crime.
In the caS8 of a large number of offenses the proof is difficult, i f net
inpo8s1ble, of Ascertainment without the testimony of individuals accessory to the act. • .. .. Ever.! day in some court of some city, an uncontrolled resort to the privilege results in a miscarriage of justice.
Legal writers are of the opini0n that tl14t rule has becm':'l8 a mat effective
technicality available to the criminal to escape p'mishmant and hinder
prosecution.

(2) It has developed the "inrnunity bath" misdhief. The detection and conviction of criminals hasso eff'eotive~ been hampered by this license that
in order to secure 80100 evidence, the Leg:i.slature has had to ?8SS various
statutes granting amnesty to criminals. • • and infinite mischief has
"!)Glan the result.

tn Onl:r the ~lilty have use for the privilege.. The natural Wtq of findini
out whether a person hascomm:l.tteda certain act is to ask him aboct it,
and if he dcmies it, to make him explain an;{ circumstances ";)Ointing to him
as the person who did it. Once a criminal trial ceases to be a game, what
evidence is l.1.kely to be so informing as that of the ~)arty alleged by the
State to have committed the act under investigation.
(4) 1'odq the accused person's rights are amply protected without the
privilege. Unless torture is confounded with interrogation, there is no
renon for the privilege today. With the publicity given to criminal
trials, the rule that a defendant shall be represonted by counsel, the
t8ci11ties tor appeal atter verdict, the scrutiny applied to the record
by the appellate courts, the liberality nth which the pardoning power is
exercised, the conviction of' innocent·mm is practically unhearp of• • • •
The necessity of guarding against governmental viciousness has ceased,
and the rule is si~4' " convenient loophole for gull ty parties to escape
punishment.
(5) The l)rovision has outlived its social utility. The impression now
held by the ~)ublic is that cri1a-l defense is a game consisting of the
introduotion of technicalities.
However t..lU.s New York Constituti0nal Conventi".;n adjourned without 'Yl&ld.ng

any changes in the privileGe against

solf-incr1minati~n.

The new Constitution

of 1939 repeats the language of t!1.e old llew York Constitutlon.

one or the ll¥)st outspoken attacks on the aroondment was delivered
~~

2! ~ ~ Revision

Commission, 378-9-80.

by Mr.
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Carman in the

!l1nnes~t!

.!e! ....Re...vi;,.;;.;.eW'...1

"The law reeks with judicial eloquence

about fair trials and the rights of the criminal.
crime ool'l'llIitted; nor a crim1nal entitled to
any crime cormnitted by

him.

But there never Vlas a fair

arr::r rights whatsoever

arisin.~

from

although he may stUl claim the benefit of the

wrongs inherent ill this archaic constitutional privilege of concealine the

evidence ot his guUt-of stabbing in the baok the ver'J

govertllIlmJ~

ullder which

he claims such privUege. • • .. In a well ordtn."8d society, to speak of the

rights of a criminal appertaining to his crime is a perversion of both languag
and logic.

There can be no such thing. A criminal haG

filii' government worthy

1'10

such rights under

ot respect untU he hae first paid the penalty for his

crime. tl2l
Mr. Carman believes th.t the privilege is the

C01!1'l1011

shield of the crimin

ot both high and low estate, offering a doorway to inmunity for the injuries
which both have in.tlictad upon the people of our land.

"Remove it; make

criminal trials a coma:>n sense investtgat!t?n of the guilt or innocence of the
•
accused, about 'Which he knows the rllOst and ne:tUl"Cllly should be the first to

testity' and disclose his knowledge, abolish all rUles of evidence that are
rooted in such constitutional. privileges of the cri::m..nal-including the

illogical

pres~tion

that the accllsed is innocent untll pr&ven gullty, 'Which

is equivalent to IX' esumtng that the grand jurors who indicted him were aither
stupid or corrup~d the crime problem would sease to be such. ,,22

2lErnest

C. Carman, itA Plea for Withdrawal of the Constitutional Pr1.vUege
!i1nnesot~ !!!! Review, XXII, 200.

Against Self-Incrimination. It

-

22Ibid.

Mr. Richard C• .Baker, • member of the New' York Bar, would also like to

aboLish the Fifth Amend1!l!lnt, and denies that tD do so would lnjure our cherisb8(
presumption of innocence until proven

~ty'.

"It is alleged that without thiS

exemption the defendant would be required to exculpate himself.
however, is farther from the t1""'llth.

In mst states, even

Nothing,

i f the immunity did

not exist. the prosecution wou.ld still be called upon to bear the burden

ot

pl"Oof 1:n a cr:tminal proceeding" and also to convince the jury of the defendant'
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The absence of the immunity' might make it

easier for the state to !)rove oertain facts, but 'WOuld not in itself shUt t.he
onus of establishing his innocence to the accused.- 23
Abolition of the privilege might make the job of prosecutor a little less
burdensome then, but Mr. Baker can find nothing mrally, ethiCally, legally,
or

oonstitution~

wrong with making a conviction less difficult tor the

prosecution.. so long as it is just as sound.
Professor WignDre speaks of the duty
capable of giving.

at

giving what evidence OM is

•
Chlef Justice Marshall irrthe trial of Aaron Burr referred

to the principle "which entitles the United States to the

teBtil'!D~

of ever.r

citiaen. .. This duty' is essential to the orderly tunctiomng of society. The
right of subpoena.. th«t is the right to :reQ.u1re other people to give evideDcej
is fundamental not. only to the welfare of the State but to the protection of
the citizen.

Indeed, the defendant's right of compulsOl"7 process in criminal

trials, the right of subpoena, is a rtrOvision of the 13m of Rights, Article
Six.

Therefore when we allow a witness to plead the FU'th Amendment, we mfV

23a1chard C. Baker. -Self-Incrimination, - Amerioan Bar Assooiation Journal
-

ILII.,. 6.35-6.

S7
e deprivine the defendant of his rights under the Sixth Aroondmentl

Logiaall.y why should not a person charged with a

ar~

be obliged to give

at explanation he can of the affair? ,1b¥ should he have the privilege of
ilenae?

Does he not owe a duty to the publio the same as aIJY" other witness?

he is innoeent

~e

has nothing to fear} i f guilty, to j i l l with him.

at formidable objection to this
eopen

~le

door to torture.

reaso~~

is that without the

The

p~_vile~e

we

But this argument 1s simply not realistic and

'gnores the other safeguards adequate and available to the defendant. Centuries
,0

when the privilege was introduced the judge was the prosecutor, too, and
jury

trill, nor right to counsel, nor appellate system. such as we

In this whole area we are deal1ng with intangibles" and a strictly logical"
Ontllate:q satiSfying conclusion defies and eludes us.

The immensely reppected

rioan Law Institute has indicated that the priviler:;e has served its purpose
and seen :'Lts d8iY.

On the other hand, the

N~

YOrk State nar Association, a

ody of national prestice ~nd influence, adopted in 195.3 the report
mmittee on CivU Rights which enbodied this resolution.

ot

its

"That the const1tu-

lonal privilege against self-incrimination continues to be a vi t!ll safeguard
f individual freedom, and the Bar shouJ.d educate the public as to i ts

i~r-

nee and diseou.r&,.,;e both those who "WOuld restrict its application and tilose 'Who
uld abuse it by asserting it improperJ.;y-..,,24
In the face of suoh eminent authority on both sides, I take

ddle

C01~e.

II

some.,hat

I remain oonvinoed that in regar' to a defendant, the privilege

24Quoted by Louis 'lta].dman,. "The Fifth
eeohes XXII, 169.

AJoon~nt,

Shield or Sword, It Vital.

I

!

no longer

sen~s Q

useful function in nndern Anglo-American jurisprudence.

In

our concern for the one innocent . . r:tct:i.rn., we are parmi tt:tng not nine, but ninety
nine r-nilt,y to escQpa from justice.

At. that I have read many hy-pothetical, but

not one factual account of an innocnnt person wholly incapable of '.J!'ov:tng his

are those innocent that it

protect~?

I SUt:;rrest then, that the Fifth koondmant requires Some roodification. In
t.."le concrete, I would withdraw the option of taking the stand from the defendant at the trial stage, but would reserve the privilege to him 2.t the pretrial stage, by insisting that no person be cOl!pelled to be a witness against
hinseU untU ·properJ,y presented, tt that is untU formally indicted by

II

grand

Ju.ry or other established Quthorit..v.
Witne~ses

too shoUld retain their claim to the privilege i f asked an in-

criminating question, for theoretical.ly' they are not even under suspiCion of
crime and have not been indio ted for aJ:V
of the defendant could

quic~ bacOii'!e

nd~deed.

Were this not so, the trial

a pretext for getting at the witness.

This is in accord 'with the age old principle that no one need disclose his own

.h.!!

hidden cri:naSI "While no one is required to betray himself. nevertheless one
!'!puted

.!2 E! fiuU,& ~ !?! reSuire,d .!2. pres0nt

himself ~ vindicate

he can."2$
_--

innocence
......
.............. i f
;.;..;...

Onl,y i f the cri!OO has been suf.ficiently bruited about to

ment, can the suspect be questioned abo,:t his guilt.

vtarrant indict-
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To s1.trrt"llarize this positionr
rormal~ indicted.
wou~d

A witness

inoriminate him.

;1Ily

The defendant m.IiG" claim the privi1.ege tmtU

claim the privilege whenever his answer

.

This Drl.vilep:e
wou.ld!j e available to the w::ttness
'.

whether quest,ioned in a civll or criminal

C01J.rt

or before

;1

congressional

committee.

With these distinctions in effect, I feel sure that crirrl.:lal trials VlouJ.d
be less frustrating and abortive, and t.'1.at the courts in our land vfculd reach

• new and exalted scale in the diS't:xmsat,lon of genuine justice, vmere all
aoqui ttals would be based on evidence, not on ignorance •.
At the same time those rights and liberties of our people

wot~ld

he rre-

served which guarantee to each of us freedom from any arbitrarr intrusion in
our private lives by' the fearsome power of the State.

"I,ll
' ,

CHAPTJ:i:R V
PREStr.!PTIO!~

OF' GUIL'l AND BlIlU1UTY STAnJTES

roES Th'VOCATION OF 'fHE FIFTH AMBNDMENT CREATE

A PREST1MP'rION OF GUILT?

We have already seen that the nrj.vllege agail'\.Bt sel.t-1ncrilrr.ination should
be withdrawn from defendants but retained for witnesses.

Our next conoern is

to determine whether the plea of the privUege by a witness eives rise to an
inference of guilt which would justify an employer in firing M.m, or refltSing
to hire him., etc.

NotiC$ that we are not seeking to use this plea as evidence

of guilt leading to conviction,
is not on trial.
. . for our wi t~s
....

issues, then, that we are seeking to solve
Amendnsnt creates a
s~tion

pres~tion

a~whether

The precise
•
the plea of t..~ Fifth

of !'1uUt., and if it does, whether that !lre-

can be used against the m.t.ness in other areas such as emp1crTnllmt.

In BoIvin!:, these questions we shall have recourse in part to those cases
where the

.~erendant

has taken

Qdvant,~

of the privilege.

He does not plead

it. in so many words, but the reason a defendant cannot be compelled to ta.ke the

st.and is beeause he cannot under th() ":lreaent Constitution be comoel1ed to be a

vii t.ness against himself in a federal. court. So whatever the courts have said
about the inference of guilt which OQn or cannot be drawn from the f.ailure of

60
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-

the defendant
to testify can be said with equal force of a witness WO pleads
,
-

the Fifth Amendment.

Twenty years ago ttd.s ;)%'Oblem

''Ie

now deal lvith appeared to have been

solvedt
UntU menile1'8 of the Communist Party began invoking the Fifth Amendment,
the lWral issue seemd jllain enough. The right to a specifiC post in
private or public employment is not • civil right. This is III rticular~
true where an individual holds II position of [.ni>lic or private trust.
Winning and holding such positions of trust are contingent ~ryon fulftIlment of certain qualifications. these qualifications are not y.1erely
technical. proficiency but extend to traits of character. They include
recognition and acC9ptance of the nnrtl obligations that ;:~ with the post.
AnDng them are the honorable fultil.l:ment of one 1 s duties, candid and above
board behavior on all matters pertaining to the tasks that are involved.
At the ver.r least, an individua). 111 • position of trust mu.st so comport
himself that he does not undermine confidence in himself or the institution that in the public flYe lie represents. Art:! boq ~ keep out of jail
by involC1ng the priv1loge against self-incrimination. But there are many
posts in which we may legitimately req~standards of conduct hir)ler
than those sufficient to keep out of jail.

And the solution agreed upon was that an employee might have a constitutional right to silence but he had

!!!! ~anciscol

case of PhristaJ. v.

110

such right to his job.

In 1939 in the

it was held that the holder of a

~oveI"lllmnt

benetit or grant would be permitted the use of the Fifth Amendment hut denied
further enjoyment of the benefit. 2 Here several policemen invoked the privUeg
when questioned about the magnitude of their
missioner dismissed them
ttDuty required them

rro~

the forcel

banl~

th~

accounts.

The Police Com-

appealed and the court declared.

to mswer. Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer.

They chose to exercise t..he ~)r1v1lege, but the exercise of such priv:1.1eeo was

lsidney Hook. Common Sense.!!!!!

233 Cal. App.

>64;

92 P.2d.

.!h! Fifth

U6.

Amendment (Rew York, 1957), 72-3.
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wholJ;r inconsistent with their duty as police officers. tt3 An illinois oourt

held that use of the privilege was "conduct unbecoming an offieer" of the

Police Department. of the City of Ch:tC8r:o.4
Thus, as Sidney Book pointed
Fifth Amendment

1'10

0

nt, it did seem clear that the plea of the

incompatible with a position ot trust. &wever with the

advent of the Communist conspiracy and the efforts of the government to expose
the extent of their infiltration, t.he whole area has somhow been reopened to

debate.

Prior to that time the Fifth A.mendment was so closelY associate4 with

the oriminal element that the courts could denounce the privilege as Done not
resorted to by honest mrm••$ But now that the spotlight has shifted over from
graft and corruption to the ideology' of the llberal left, resting upon the in-

tel1eetual e11te of education, SCience" and art, somehow the very same plea
gives rise to • ver:t dU'ferent connotation., We are now asked at times to sua-

pend our judgment; at others, to see in the plea the cry of wounded innocence".
or a ringing challenge to despotic power by ,a

~yr

for civil liberties.
"

One of the leading proponents of • ttstainless rt Fifth AmendDmt is Dean
Griswold of the Harvard La School, whose recent book on this subject has enjoyed wide circulation and exerted great influence.

The Dean asserts that the

plea of the privilege reveals nothing about the guilt or innocanoe of the
claimant himself.

In support of this, the Dean proposes thNe or four hyp0-

thetical oases in which the witness is innocent

!>.l PYeethesisJ

3Ibi3

4339 Ill. App. 33; 88 B.E.2d. 728 (1949).

--

>United States v. Mammoth Oil Co.,

......................

14 F.2d. 705 (1926) •

yet ror one

6:;
reason or another pleads the privilege.

to ir>..t:er from the plea that
~ hlr0~lesis

theEIS r~n

And of course as the Dean points

were

gu1l~

out.

would be manifest error since

tha,1 are innocent.

Sidney Hook counters by asking what a normal person wou.ld do When faced

with a pointed gun? His normal reaotion w1ll be alarm and an effort to get out

of range, for the overwhelming we:tght of sXperia!loe teaches that such • situa-

tion could be mrtally da.l1geroUS. Now if' we assume by hypothesis that the gun
is empty then aU the flurry and scurry appears a little ridiculous, but not

unreasonable, for the victim does not know that the gun is empty and harmless,
but relies on experience which says that it is dangerous.

So too experience

teaches that the majority of people who plead the Fifth Amendment are shielding
guilt..

"The psychologicfl, tendency

to draw an adverse Werence from the in-

vocation of the privilege is not innate. It hasheen acquired as a result of
experi.ence.

It 1s so strong that it would hard:1y be an exaggeration to charao-

ten.. it today as natural or nol'1!Ull. Beca¥StI of the place of the privilege
in the rules of procedure, the IlIff'S of some bUt. not all states warn expressly

against, the nat'l.1nl1 tendency to draw an adverse inference i f the defendant

does not testifY in hiso'Wl'l behalf to rebut an aeeusation...P
OM can construct hypotheses of innocence ~ infinitum.

is

·~'lhether thcf'{

The ?oint at taBU

correspond with expt-il'ience. It is rather strange

th~t

after a

life in the 1_" Dean Gri81lO1d must have recourse to hypothesis, rather than
CUes

to

SU5yport

his contention.,

The ru1es of evidence, jury t.rials, and all the machL'1.ery of ,justice are
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not proof agdnst oocasional injustica. The 18 does not demand of a jury that
they find t.1.9 defendant guilty with rldaphy'sicalcertainty, nor even :ooral

certainty, but oIlly' that the guilt of the d.efendmt be est.Ushed beyond
reasonlQ:)le doa'bt.

So too the

pres~tion

of guilt arising from t,i.e plea of' the

Fift..'It kllmdment is not conclusive, for not eve!I one who pleads the privilege

is shieldinr; guilt, but must we therefore act as though no one were?
The Supreme Court recently indtcated that we must.

!! ~ucation 2! !!!! ~ !:?! !!!! ?!,ork,

In SJ.oehower v. Board

a Cit-.f College professor had been dis-

missed under a New York Oity Afunicipal Charter provision reqltiring the discharge, vdt.hOilt notice or hearing, of a municipal employee utilizing t..he privi-

lege against. selt..incrimination in refusing to answer legally authorized' inquiries as to his official conduct.

oonGressional committee

7 Slochower" in his appearance hefore a

L~stigating

matters of national security, refused to

answer questions regarding past membership in
sequen~ tired

~~e

Communist Party, and was stib-

1n accord 'With the Charter p;",ovision.

Fiva maSers of the
•
United States Supreme Court held that the dismissal was inpooper because no

inference

or • witness'

guilt of past memership in the Communist party 1~ be

drawn from hi.s refusal, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to IIIlS'ftr

questions of .. congressional commtttee respecting such membership.

The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Cllll'k who asserted t,hat
the New York Charter abridged a privilege or inmranity of a citizen of ·!:.he Unitecl

states since it in effect imposes a
guaranteed right in

II

federal

~enal~

proee~ding.,

on the exercise of a federally

It also violates due process because

65
the rrere claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment does not provide :a
reasonable basis for the state to t.erndnate his employment.
Furthermore the Court condemned the practice of imputing a sinister maani.ni

to the exercise of the privilege. "In

~"'llman

v.

U;nit~d

States, we derided the

assumption that those who claim this 'Jrivilege are either criminals or perjurers. The privilege against selt-incri!1Il.nation would be reduced to a hollow
IJDCkery if' its . .reise would be taken as equivalent either to a confession of

guilt or a conal us1ve presumption of perjlll".Y• • • • A witness lUY have a
reasonable fear

ot

prosecution and yet be innocent of 8l\Y wrongdoing.

The

privilege serves to protect the innocent who othendae might be ensnared by
anbiguous circumstances. itS

In • dissenting opinion by' Mr. Justice Reed, in which Justioes !.Jinton and

Burton concurred. it was said that a

leg.~

authorised

bo~

has a right to

demand that citizens furnish facts pertinent to official inquiries, and althougJ
the duty to respond

IUy be

refused for

p8rs~nal

a refusal to furnish such information can

protection against prosecution,

proper~

'.
be considered to stanp
a

public employee as a person unfit to hold certain orfic.iaJ. positions.
In his separate dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan declared that teachers who

have refused to answer questions concerning their official conduct are no
longer quilitied for public school teaching, on the ground that their retusal

to answer jeopardis.es the COnfidence the publlc would have in its school system..
IIfr. Louis 'Waldman finds that Ifthe use of the rifth Amendment as a means of

convicting people in the public eye is disturbing and frighteninr and is doub:q-

6Ibid. 699.

-

II
III
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wrong.

It does great injustice to the person so described.

And at the same

tim it dev-ades thts constitutional !'rivUege in the minds of the public • .,9

;,tt-. WalcllnAn t S argument rinds su.p'f:)Ort in the case of

~urdick

v.

.!!Iliteq

States whioh held that the 'privilege supposes "only a possibility of a charge
of crime md tnterposed protection

~a.i.nst

the charge, and

1"eaehin~

beyond it.

~ai_nst f'ltmtshing what might be llt"~ed as evidence to support it...10 Alld
it is not neoessaril3'

8

80

sense of t.!uilt that entttles a person to '9TO?E!rly plead

the !'l"1vllol1'e. Fear of prosecution 19 su.t"fioient, for it is a l1enooe to the
peace, ::,;ood name, and dignity of an
in acqUittal.

~_ndividW.

even i f the trial. should result

Thus the facts which a witness hides behil'ld the Fifth A.'!lendnent

marr not be proof of guilt but still suf.ficiently incriminating to eX!'ose him
to prosecution.

.

John Cogley, writing in Comnnnweal,
.. cites further reasons for caution

before

drQw:tnr~ ~

"~ituat1ons

conclusions' from a plea of the privilege.

must be taken into account

He

decla~s

that

befo~

al\j conclusions are reached•
•
There is no unavoidable" inescapable, inevitable conclusion to be reached nerelJ
beoartM someone has invoked the Fifth Lll'll':tm:imnt.

It is as illor;ical to conclude

automatically that he is guilty of the thing charged as it would be to conclude
that he is innocent ot it.

!he ciroumtanoes of • congressional hearing are

spec:!.al indeed and each ease varies.

The matter depends much on. the natrl.re ot

the imolied charges, the character of the committee and its counsol, and the
real--as distinct from the nominal-rmrposes of the comm:t.ttee."ll

9Louis Waldman.. "The Fifth Amendment," Vital. Speeches J nIl, 192.
1'""'236 if;) 79, 94 (1914) •.
11John Cogley. "1,lhe Controversial Firth," CommnJ\veal. Ll'VIt 86.
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This tolerant, liberal attitude towardS the Fifth !nendlMnt which the
toregoing opinions and articles have expressed was not alw&tys in vogue.
Sta~

v.

!,art,fett,

In

the court declQ!'('l!d that Dan inference does arise un.deniab13.

It 1s evidence the tore. of which mJlt?' depend ~'r)on circumstances. rtl2. tfSuoh an
It will be drawn by honest jurymen. find

inference is natural and irresistible.

no instructions w1.ll. prevent it. • • • The rights ot aooused are not :i.nvaded
or denied by 'Proper co1Illtent upon his sUenoe••13 For apart from the Fifth
Amendment, it is • eenertal principle of the 1_ of evidence that silenoe gives

rise to an adverse inference. In tact an eminent law;rer has described silence
as "one ot the mst powerful inferences" if not the met p.artu.l :tnf'ermce.. in
hUmml

af'tail'8.1Il4 Even in crimtnal cases where the silence ot the accused is

based upon

1m

il1{>l1clt appeal to the Fifth AmendIoont, some states" as Ohio.

provide in their constitutions that. the jury mq draw such inferenoe as it sees
fit from the failure of the defendant to test1f'y in his own behalf, And that in

summation the

~rosecution ~

comrnant on

thi~

silence of the defendant •

•
Ho1ntver in other states it is forbidden b:t' statute to dr_ an adverse in-

ference from the silence

ot the Mfendant

in a criminal trial.

Professor

Preenleat of Harvard was, .t the tine these statutes were introduoed, the author
~f

the leading treatise on the law of evidence. He made the following interes-

~1ng comrrent. -It ~ be doubted whether a statute which prohibits any such in~erence is

not nugatory as contrar,y to

Us, Me.

~he human mind.

A. statute that upon

200 (l.867).

l3parker v. ~tate. 39 AU. 651 (1898).

(,

lhc.

D. w:1.lli_, "The Fifth Araend;'rsnt.,tt Ma:3uettel:!! Review, XXXIX

~rr1nter, 195;.6)~

210.
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proof that the sun was shining, no inference that it was light should be drawn
by the jury, if' not against the eonstitution of a State, is against the nature

of things. 015
It ....ould seem safe to say that Professor Greenleaf' would join

Ohio, New Jersey, and a few other states in allowing comment to the
an inference so natural.

~

jUl'",{

Britail

about

The inference is also allowed in California by con-

stitutional amendment, so t hat the pertinent article now reads I "No person
shall be

co~elled

to be a witness aga1n8t himselt in ADY criminal case. .. •

but in att:I criminal oase, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or to deny by- his testimny tmy evidence or facts in the case aga1rur
him may be cotmnented upon by the court and by cotUlSel, and may be oonsidered
by the

court or jU17. ttl6

The interesting case of Admiral De1re,y Adamson v. Oalltond. arose under
this particular article of the California Constitution.,17 At his trial,

Adamson pleaded the privilege as guaranteed by the State Constitution., The
court allowed co~nt as as also permitted by- the same Constitution.,.• Adamson
appealed. on the now familiar

8rgunmlt

that comment violated the FU'th Amendment

of the Federal Bill of Rights which had been incorporated (he argued) in the
rights guaranteed to every citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme

Court rejected t.he arg1.1Illellt" citing

~

v.

!!!

J~rsez

as authority.

In his

majority opinion, :Mr. Justice Reed saids "However sound IllCY be the legislative

-

15nreenleaf, Evidence, 14th ed. (Boston, 18S:n .. I,
16Constitution of California, Article 1,
1.791 L.ed. 190) (1948).

ru.
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I.

conclusion that an accused should not be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness ar::ainst hlmselt, we see no reason why comment shotud not be made
upon M.B silence.

It seem8 natura! that when a defendant has opportunity to

deny or explain facts and determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring

out the strength of the evidence by commenting upon the defendant's failure to
explain or deny it.

The prosecution"s evidence

beyond the knowledge of the accused.

"IJJIq

be of facts that may be

If so, ld.s taUure to testifY would have

little, i f a!\V, weight. But the facts mB3' be such as are necessaril..v in the
knowledge of the accused, in that case a faUure to explain would point to an

inabillty to uplain.-18

And in a separate concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared that
"sensible and just-minded men, in important artilia of life, deem it sirmificant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible

evidence against himself which it is within

hi8p()'1'f0l"

to contradict. The notion

that to allow jurore to do that which senaib,le and right-minded man do every d-"
"

violates the immutable principles of just1.ce .. conceived by •

civil1~ed socie~

is to trivialize the itlt>Ortance of due process...19

The federal law of the Un! ted States

express~

forbids comment upon the

silence of the accused.20 But this exclusion is c18ar~ a matter of policy and
not

Ii

denial that the silence has evidentiary value" for the SuprelOO Court, as

in the Adamson Cllse, has said that. the aUenee of the a ccused is genuine evi-

-

l.8Ibid.

20Act of March 16, 1818, 20 Stat. 301

U.S.c., tit. 28, sec. 632 (1926).
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denc. which can be submitted to the jury where there is not an express statutol"j

provision to the oontrar,y.
This attitude, of course, has not found universal acceptance.

In Colorado

the SUpreme Court of the State held that if an inference is drawn from silence
there is a :oractical abrosation of the constitutional provision that no man is

to be conpe1led to incriminate hImself'. "For if the silenoe is to be taken as
evidence of guilt, the defendant.s option is of little avail; he is

praetio~

forced to testify" and once upon the stand may be required to give the very
21
But cases so holding are in
testimony upon whioh his conviction shall rest...
a minority. And it must be noted that even here the inferenoe is rejected not
because it is invalid" but because :i. t is deemed to oontlic. with the right of
the accused not to incriminate himself.

When we look to the rule in .!:!2..n-01"..;;;.;;.i..mi;;;;;;;;;D...al
.. proceedings we find that almst
without exception it is the general holding that an adverse inference

alw~

In United States v. Malmmth
•
Oil Co. the oourt asked. "Why is silence the -answer of a former cabin,at officer

follows from an invoCation of the i'ifth Amendment.

--

to the oharge of oorruption? Why is silence the onl;y repl¥ of Sinclair.. a man
of large

b~iness

affairs, to the charge of bribing an official of his govern-

ment? Wh.y" is thiB plea of selt-incrimination-one not resorted to by honest
man-tbe refuge of Fall's son-in-law, Everhart?,.22
SO we have seen that in both civil and criminal cases the plea of the
Amendnmlt alVl8y'8 gives rise to an inference of guilt, but that in a criminal

21Patite v. People. 8 Colo. 518, 9 Pac. 622 (J.B9$); see also Maffie v.
united states, 2~ ,.~a. 22$.. and Qginion ~~ Justices, 126 N.E.2d. 100.

2~ 1.2d. 70" 729 (1926).
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case the inferenoe arising out of the sUenoe of the aocused oannot be called

to the attention of the jury and made t.he subject of com'nent, except in those
few states which so permit.

perceptible even

the~,

However the inference is nonetheless real and

for it is not a mere ooincidence that in the great

majority of oriminal cases the ju.ry finds guilty alt'! defendant who has failed
1:.0 take the stand.

"None of the courts and none of the authorities• • • oan

deny that in every case in which the defendant refuses to take the stand the

tact will be noticed by the jury and that the jury will draw the natural inferences therefrom.,.23

That such a real and valid inference can be drawn has also long been
recognized by the legal profession.

The American Law Institute in its lbde1

--

Code of Evidenoe states that the rule should bet nIt an accused i.n a criminal
action does not testUy, the judge and counsel may co:mm&nt upon the accusedts

faUure to testify, and the trier of fact T£JIIY draw
therefrom.

Comment. 'fbis has been aecepted

IMine and oossibly New Jersey and

an

reasonable inferences

~nowhere

Connecticut~·

at comnon law except in
•
In most states a. sta-l:.ute or the

current interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision prohibits all
COntlllmt

and inferences.

Such enactments have usual.ly prevented the evolution

or development of a oottmlOn law doctrine in this country.
now permitted as a result of the repeal of

III

In Iowa oomment is

statute which forbnde

S11Ch

oOmnDnt' ~4

It seems clear then that the 1)lea of the Fifth Amendment in whatever
situation alWl!l'.Y1l creates ,. presumption or inferenoe of guilt. The presUFlption

23AndrE:w A.. Brucet "Failure of the Accused to Testif"J.. "
Revi,!;M (Deceni>er, 1932), 230.

24Anerican Law Institute, Model

~.2!

~hir;sn ~

Evidence. Rule 201, (3).

12
is not conclusive but it does have evidentiary value, more or less Mpending
upon aU the facts and circumstances. One of the facts or circrunstances which
will

al~s

have to be considered, especiall1 in the investip,ation of

is the holding; of the Bogers case. 25

Under examination, the ,rl.tness Rogers

answered a few questions abou.t preaant communist membership, but then
the Fifth Amenc:Imnt when pressed about nrior menbership.

once Rogers chose to answer
lege as to

.!!! questions

~

Gommunis~

The

question on this matter, she

COlU"t

wai~

~1eaded

held that
her privi-

on the matter. In the light of this caso, i f a

witness were asked 1£ she were

Communist party member in the year 1900

8

(twenty-five years .. say, before she was born)" she would have to plead the 'ift]:
Amendment and retuse to aJ'l8\'rer.

The question is hardl.y incriminating, but i f

she answers it, she may be asked about memberShip in the year 1945, and perhaps
this repl;y would b.

considerab~ r001"$

el'.li>arrassing.

I am afraid this decision

is an unfortlmate extension of the sound rule in criminal law that when an

accused takes the stand he 1'!lUSt remain for cross-examination. There we can see
why an aocused should

taining

It

W':i:tnesse~

not be allowed to tell.,all the good things white main-

discreet sUeno. about the bad. However to apply the same Jmle to
can only have the effect of drying up' the tont. But good or bad, we

can see that the holding of the Roeers case is a very

i~ortant

circumstanoe to

be considered in weighing the value of the inference.

This settled, we can go on to consider the second question. 'Whether an
emplo;rer in a sensitive field

m&y

fire An employee who invotted his privilege

when called as a witness betore the oourt or congressional oommittee. We know

2SRogers

v.

tmited states,.. 95 L.ed. .344 (1950).

I
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that this plea gives rise to an inference of guilt.. but can

ference to fire the employee?

'We

use that in-

laster Justice Holmesthought so 'When he held thai

the -petitioner rtIlr3' have a constitutional right to talk polities, but he has no

constitutional right to be a pollceman.,tt 26 The highest court of Uassachusetts
thought so when it held that a teaoher employed to serve "at discretion" in the
Boston Public Schools

cOL~ld

be dismissed for refusing to answer. on the ground

of the privilege against self-incrimination, the questions of a subconmdttee of
the United States Senate as to whether he was

II

meDber of the Connmmist Party..2'

The Supreme Court of the United States at least used to think so (before the
810011ower decision) when it held that the fact that divuJ.ging ;last or present
membership in the Communist party might under some oirculJ.lllrtances amount to

selt'-inoriuti.nation did not divest the government of power to require anBy,rera
as a condition of continued employment.

28

In addition, the PresidenU of Harvard and Dartnnuth, as well as the

American Assooiation of University

Professo~s

have all publlcl;y" stated that the
•
plea of the Fifth Amendment creates an inference of guilt as a matter ot com'IOn
sens8. 29 If'. faculty nember invokes the Fifth ArJl8ndnJent, his institution cannot ignore the possible significance for itself of these matters.

It must be

said that the aforementioned do not consider the pa.ea as tantaroount to resignation as the lin York Chal'lter did, but rather as a matter inviting f.ull inves-

2~Au.U.tj'e V.

!'!! Beators,

27"axon v. School Committee

155 Mass. 2J.6. 29 N..E. 517 (1892).

2.! Boston.

120 N.E.2d. 772 (1954).

28nartlEtr v. Board 2! Public VIm-ks, 95 L.ed. 1317 (19.51).
29
Hook, COll11IDn Sense ~ ~ !.i!'.~ Amendment (New York.. 1957): 7h, B9, 95.
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tieal:.ion which could lead to terminat,ion of services if' the fact.s warrant.
Fl~fessor

Sidn8,y Hook describes the Slochower decision as one of the most

scandalous opinions in the histor,v of the Supra_ Court.

lilisn

t.~a

court de-

clared that Sloehowerfs plea of the FU'th AlllmdlOOnt created no in.faranoe of
-iil'lCm it denied the right of' the local

guilt, it was shockingl.y unrealistic.
govenL~nt

to establish norms of fitness for its personnel, it

great~v

the already diminis..'ling authority of state and local goverIL1Ient.

curt_ilAd

It can only

Ibe hoped that in the future the case will be clis tinguished and restrioted to

the narrow holding that" statute 'Whioh provides for automatio .,dismissal without hearing is unconstitutional as

II

violation of' due process, but that the

r:i.e;ht of the states to dismiss comIn1inists from sensitive posts after proper
hearing has in no

w~

been impaired.

In conolusion. since the plea does create a presumption of guilt, the

sounder opinion by far, it seems to me, would permit an employer to dismiss
ctf employee who pleads the Fifth Amendment. i f the nature of the office is

such that the oocupant must be above suspioion~

No one questioned the right

of George lMany, President of the A. F. ot L. to fire David Beck froll the Exscuttw Counoil of the Union when he habitually resorted to the FUth A;nendment
during an investigation of Union funds.

The substitution ot Com.nU'''ist party

r'Jenooership for financial. mali'easance as the field of inquirp' does not reaJJy

change the nature or character of the plea. A presumption of guilt arises in
both cases and will have greater or less value depending upon all the circumstances.

But value it has, and existence too.
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THE ADEQUACY OF r,iM,TINITI STATllTES

Legislatures of State and Federal governments have felt it necessar,r from
time to time to pass imnunity statutes which empower the government, when confronted by a plea of the Fifth

~ndl:lIgnt,

to offer complete

imrnimiV to the

witness or defendant in exchange for the critical information.
is complete.

The immtmity

It extends beyond the testimol\V given and reaches to the crime

itselt.30 ~he immunity

l1lq

be granted at the option of the state, 1lhile the

individual. has no choice but to accept if tendered him.

These immunity statutes have u two hundred year history in EnP.'.,land and
have been popular in the united States at least hill that time.

Their obvioUIJ

function is to obtain the evidence 'Which the State finds indispensable tor legislation or prosecution, but which hitherto was inaccessible behind the FU'th
Amendment.

In balancing the rights of' the individual against the

~gencies

of the state, the imnuni ty statute was devised as an equitable compromise.

A

compromise and not a complete substitute-for the position of the witness is
undenid:>J;r altered, and that for the worse. B~fore, he could plead the privilege and risk obly the inference of¢lt, which is never conclusive and always

to some degree uncertain. But once imtrnized, he must tell the whole story of
his inf'al1tY, in all its details. leaving no room for doubt or the benign inter-

pretation.

3OCounselman v. Hitchcock.

l42

US

547

(1891).
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The great connict over these iw.munity statutes rages over the intf)nt of
the Founding Father8 as to the scope of the AUVjndmen t.. Those in favor of the
statutes insist that the Fathers mAant only that the defendant should not be
made to convict himself.,

to

The opponentn insist that the AmendilJent was designed

protect reputation and honor and [xt;"ivacy, all ot which

perhaps nnre, value than mere physical freedom.

r~

have as much, and

To the forner an immunity

statute is entirely adequate) to the latter a grave injustioe.
The question here is to determine the intent of the legislators, and since
that is the function of the judiciar,r, let usturn to the cases. Before doing
so, however, it might be ovserved that our inquiry into this field has onlY
an academic value, for there is no lildihood-not even under the present Supre
Court-that the uniform decisions of eeventy-five years will ever be overthr

But we can expose the difficulties and perhaps suggest a

rna leading case is Brown v.

~al1~~r1

~

modifications.

decided in 1895, where the defendant

claimed that he need not reply to :LTJt.errogai;1on even though there was a federal.
statui;.~

grant:L.-,g him full inmrunity from prosocution..

The court admitted that

the statute co uld not shield the defendant £ronl the personal disP.',race and
opprobrium which would follow upon the exposure of his crime, but decided that
i f the PIPOposed

testim:>ny was material. to the issues of the trial., then the rae

that his answers might tend to degracie him did not

exe~t

him from the duty of

disc 10 sine the same.
A person who commits a crimina.l act is bound to coate~late the consequences of exposure to his good nama and reputation, and OugJ:lt not to call
upon the courts to protect that wh...tch he himself' esteemed to be ot such
little value. The safety and welfare of the entire community should not
be put into the sode Ag.mst the reputation of a selt'....oonfessed criminal,
'Who ought not. either in Jus'tice or good mrals" to refuse to disclose
that wtlioh may be of great public utUi1;y.. in order that his neighbors 1'iUV"

r
'!

"I'.

I'

17

I

think nll of him.. The cktsign of the oonstitutional privilege is not to
aid the wttnesa in vindicating hischaracter, but to protect him against
being compelled to furnish evidence to oonvict him of a criminal charge.
If he secures legal i1ll!lunity from pIYOSecutlon, the possible impairment of
his good name is a penalty !iiCh it is reasonable he should be compelled
to pay for the common good.

Perhaps the best defense ever formulated of theFifth Amndment and the
rights of the individual

WSfl

that of

r.~.

Justice Field in his dissenting

opinion to the holding of Brown v. Wd'ker.

He maintained that the framers of

the Fifth AlnendIoont intended to save the witness in all oases fro,:l the shame
and infanw

ot confessing disgraceful crimes,

and thus preserve

to him

sorre

measure of sal£-respect. The oonstituticmal privilege reflects "the abhorrence
felt at the

le~~al

com;>ul.sion upon witnesses to L.1.ake concessions vd1ich must

the wi tIless '''T1 th lasting shame and leave him degraded

~oth

OOVel

in his own eyes and

those of pthers. "'hat can be more abhorrent. • • tihan to compel a

lllm1

who had

fought his way from obscurity to dignity and honor to reveal crims of which
he had repented and of which the \vorld was ignorant.

And it is very justl,y

urged that a statute is not a full equivaldnt under which a Ydtness mey be com-•
palled to cover himself with the tnf'anv of e cri.me, even though he TIlI!V be ar:m8C
with a nroteotion against its merely penal. consequences. n)2
!,fr. Justice Field could cit. as authority for bis position the case of

,~ni.ted States v. James, decided

iTl the federal oO!.Jrts the year before. 33

There

Ju<l,~

Grosscup held that the immun:lty statute involved violated the Fourth and

n.r-tib.

Ar~wndloonts.

The Jud:.;e believt'lu that the Fifth Amencboont secured to the

3lsrown v. Walker, 161 US 894 (1895).

32!k.~.

3360 F. 257 (1894).
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individual his right ot silence against the right of the government to seek out
data for an accusation; that it was rooa.:lt to protect the witness against the

practical effect of
feitures.

outl~J,

as well as the law-inflicted

per~lties a~d

for-

Ii' not, the government could probe the secretes of every conversa-

tion or society by extending pardon to one of its pm-ticipants, and thns turn

him into an involuntar,r informer.

PThe oppression ot crowns and prinCipalities

is unquestionably over, but the more frightful oppression

ot seUish, ruthless,

and merciless majorities Il'lIJY yet constitute one of the chapters

tor,y. In

~

or future

opinion, the privilege of silence, against criminal

his-

acctb~ation,

guaranteed by the Fifth Amend1lent, was meant to extend to all tho consequences
of disclosure...34
fuming for a moment

to a

coming up again in Ullman v.

lOOre

unita~

recent case, we find the
States.

SSl'lW:l

question

35 Here the immunit~r statu.te under

attack was that passed by Congrees in 1954 seeking to expedite investigation in
the area of national security. The petitioner sought to distinglJish .Brown v.
Walker on the ~md that Itthe i~act of the·,disabilities ~osed by' federal
and state authorities and the public in genera!-such

BS

108s of

~iob.

expulSion

fromlabor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport ineligibility, and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute
does not give him true immurrl:l;y.n.36

34n,id.
35350 US 422 (1956).
36Ibid.

~-~

I'l
,:1'1'
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il

M:tster Justice Frankfurter replied in his majority opinion that ttthe inter-

diction of the rUth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incrimi..'lste himsell'-in other words to e;ive testinnny which may possibl,r expose
him to a crimtnal charge. But i f the criminality has already betm taken tI.fnitT"
the Amendment ceases to apply• .,37

In

8

strong dissent, Mr. Justice Ihuglu .. with Justice Black concurring,

pointed out the numerous disabillt,ie.'3 ereated by federal law that attach to a
person 'Who is a communist-inel1gibility for t9ntlloyment in the federal government or defense facilities, etc.

These, he insisted, are forfeitute3 within

the .meaning of American cases and as much protected by the Fi.fth A.'IlJen&1ent as

crittrl.nal prosecution itself.

But since these forfeitures are not nrevented by

the immunity statute, it must

bes~wk

Counsel~

v.

~i tchcock,

down.

For as the court had held in

an immunlty st.atute, to be valid, must Itsuppl,y a com-

plete !>retect1on .from all the }>er:iJ.s against whioh the constitutional prohibition wu desi~d to guard.,a.38

•
Another objeotion to immunity statutes i.-s· that they are ofttm. no guarantee
even against prosecution and imprlGoni:lCnt.

Federal imunity

doe~:

prosecutors, nor does state imrrmrrl.ty bind federal prosecutors.

not bind state

This result is

based on the legal fiction that federal oourts cannot be expected to take
notice of the laws of the states and vice versa.

The injustice to any witness

whose misdeed was a crime in both jurisdiotions is manifest' His immunized
testimony ill the feeleral cou.rt can be takel\ down by a state prosecutor and used

--------

-

37Ibid.

.38142 US 547 (1891).

I ,
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to convict him in a subsequent state trial, or vice versa.
As I indicated earlier it would be impractical at this late

dat~

to attempt

to overthrow the bed-rock foundation of irrenu.nity statutes, n('lr vlO'J.ld it be wise;
for however e;reat the harm to the individual, the benetits to the State and the
coll'tmn good are overriding.

I also believe that the majority view, holdlng

imlrruni ty statl,ltes an adequate substitute for t.l-te Fifth !roondment, reortrysents

the mind of the Founding Fathers. As a simple test of this, l'lh,v were the words
"in a crlmtnal case" deliberate33 added to the Amendroont upon the rrntion of Mre

Lawrence?.39 The rea80nable llL"lmmr seems to be that reached by the c:::tTts-the
intention of the men who drew up the Amendment was only to shield a defendant

-

f1'o1:1 the onus of' furniShing the evidence that would convict hin
,

any nther consequences must be borne by hi:'4

To make sure that a defendant

en;

or

a criroo, IIrl:I'

vdtnass is protedted !'rom ae1£-cmw1.ctio

I wou.ld sue;gest a law or Congress mR.ktnr; any immu.'1ity statute binding U1)(m

~

st..ate and federal authorities.

It would also have to provide that immunity
•
could not be offered to a witness without thee prior consent of t,he Justioe
Departments of both sovreignties.

That should eliminate one ob.jection to i!$tunity statutes.

The other, con-

cerning the disgrace and infB.ne:" of t."1e witness, cannot be 'Wholly eradicated.
But I should think
reduced.
to

-

£;0

~lat

In England the

beyond the nlls.

the harnd\tJL
testimo~

40

cor~equences

of a vdtness before Parliament is not allowe

Not lonr; ago masked ref'ueees testified before our

39Carter R. Pittman" "The Fifijl:l P:~:ndl'Ient,tf'

-

40n>id. 593.

could be oontrolled and great

42

~

509.

Congress, and the fact that their identity was known but to a very few did not
seem to i~ir

the value of their testimony-.

Admitted1.y there may he times

when testirony would have no value lIDless the SOJrce were di..selosed, but intellieent safeguards would minillrize the damage to the rel?utation of the 1m-

I

i'

I,

A proper regard for the dignity and Wlrth of the individual and due consideration for the value of his good name, should make us abhor wanton destruction of a tellow man, and seek by every means to return the witness to
8Ociet.y AS little harmed as possible.

These

mea~,

while short of the ideal; would go III long

wlq

to

':H~otect

the witness from all the perils to vlhieh the L"mltllnity statutes have exposed h1Ia..

II!

,I

ji

III
'I

I,

CHAPrEl~

VI

i

CONCLUSION

II

This final. chapter w:Ul consist of a summary of the facts and findings of

this topic.
"~

The priv'J.lege against self-incrimination derives from the ma:xim

tenetur prodere 8etpsum-Iloboctr is bound to accuse himself.

Thia

privUege developed in England where untu well into the nineteenth century.,

there wre three distinct systems of courtsi comroon

1_, equity,

and ecclesi-

astiCal, each of which had developed oTer the centuries its own :node of

II

I
Ii

I
I,

I'
I

procedure.
It was during the period of the Inglish Comroonwealth that the privilege

became general. Its immediate origin was in pDOtest against a procedural oath

of the ecclesiastical. courts. the oath!! officio. The practice before such
courts was than arvona aocused I!!!

fa~, us~

by

two witnesses, had to deny

the charge by oath ewn before trial or stand accused by' his own s ilenee.

Court of

The trial of John L:Ubum fooused the attention of England on the ex

-officio procedure.

Four years later,

161.&:4

the Star Chanber and the

Hir.,h Commission and the ex officio procedure wre abolished.
-

The effect was

I

felt in the cOJmll)n law courts and, according to some, becam such an integral
part of cOJllll)n law criminal procedure during the subsequent years that it was
taken for granted and not even mentioned in the Bill of Riehts of 1689.
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In America the privilege gained ground steadily even to this day, but not

without increasing opposition.

So much attention has been called to the privi-

lege of late as to warrant a study of its nature and function, whioh this thesis
has sought to do.

The first quest:'-on to arise was whether the Fifth Amendment

was a natural right.

It seemed clear upon investigation that the American

courts had newr considered it so, refusing consistently to include it among

the basic rights guaranteed to all Ameridan citizens by the Constitution.
Annng scholastics there tlas no t been too much work done on this particular
point of

Ii

natural right not in incriminate oneself. All we co:ud do

.from analogy-.

w_ argue

If every man has a natural right to his good reputation, then

perhaps he also has· a natural. right to refrain from disclosi.nr, anything that
would destroy that reputation.
Of course that is the whole t"!u8stion.

Does a criminal hav'e such a right

and Saint Thomas would answer ftno.!t The problem really goes deeper.
e.yes of the State, a man is not a criminal until convicted.
that a criminal does not have a
a suspect have no such right?
and oonviction?

rl.,~ht

In the

Therefore to

to silence l1l8"'J be clear

en('nu:~h~'

s~

bnt does

For ,.,00 can know who is a criminal until trial

Short of this we run t."1e risk

or

unjustl;;r denying to an

--

------- ...

innocent party what we could justly deny to a criminal i f ..-we -...-...knew ......
he were a
~

~

criminal, which we do not. lb:'. Justice Brandeis expressed this

v.re~l

Stead v. United States.

-

in OJ.m,..

The n18..1{ers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to

the pursuit of happiness. Th8'J reoogniz.ed the significance

or

man's

spiritual. nature, of his fee~s and of his intellect. They knew that
o~ a part or the pain, pleasure and satisfactions or life are to be
found in material things. The:J s01J.ght to protect Americans fn thtdr beliefs•. their thoughts, their e:.mtions, and their sensations. They conterred as against the Government.. the rirrht to be let alone-the mst

84
comprehensive of rights and the right !J.J)st valued by civilized men.
protect that right, every fmjustifiable intrusion by the Govermoont
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, limst be
6. violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidenoe in Ii
crimin.l proceeding, of ficts ascertained by such intrusion must be
I! violation of the Fifth.

To
upon
deemed

deemed

On the other hand, a suspect is a suspect precisely because there is
~~dr S!llOunt of

Ii

It is l:,ossible that at

e,,"idence 8ssociatiniS hL:i1 vdth the crime.

rt,his point the COmJlX)n good intervenes in favor of unshackling the police power

pf the State at the expense of private interests-hera, those of the suspect.
~e

risk involved is evident and the solution requires a nice balancing of

~nterests.
~alance

Many other jurisdictions. thus far at least, have cast up the

and fomt it wanting in regard to the privllege.

It has been !I\V own conclusion that the privilege is not a natural right.
This in turn raiSed the second question, whether the AnDndment should he retained nevertheless.

After a review of all the arguments for and ngainst, it

seerood best to deny the right to a defendant at the tr'l.al prn)er, ;)!-eser-vin[; it

to

hi~il

at all times prior to the tria)..

pnttected.

Witnesses, however, "vvDuld remain i'ully

The defendant lost his right to Silence, in

nw opinion, 'when

sufficient evidence was offered to WQXTant an indictn:l.ent.
a witness.
~i~~ht

No evidence of al\'! [:,u.ilt on

to the privilege shou.ld remain

~lis

part has been presented and so his

'~::..."1i;llpaired.

The evidenoe of the witness, it is true,
i:n'"erest, t!i.e cOnJ.;ron good.

This is not, t,rus of

m.-r be

vital for t he national

In this case, the witness must yield his !'i.ght to

the privllege in favor of the :nero H":'Gont right of the State t.:> his testi:mny.

1277 US 438 (1928).

Ii

,il

85
I

The State :i.n addition should take whatever steps are necessar;).r to sJ,,:.1.old ·t.he
I

witness as far as possible from an;:r 10s8 as a result, of h:':'D

defin:t tive treatment of

SOr'oC

e'~opC)ration.

fascinat,:tng aspects of the Fifth

A:Je!ldTl~nt.
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